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DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULTS 
AND DEFAULTS⎯AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 
Dr. Helen Anderson* 
Abstract:  Australia’s new Rudd Government has indicated to business leaders that 
it intends to review various aspects of corporate law, including the imposition of personal 
liability on directors for corporate fault.  Their concern is that the present corporate law 
regime is causing directors to be overly cautious in making decisions, to the detriment of 
the efficient operation of companies and the well-being of our economy.  At the same 
time, the government acknowledges the importance of imposing appropriate sanctions 
where a company or its officers fail to meet required standards.  These are universal 
concerns.  To inform this debate, this article will look at the way in which key aspects of 
corporate law are dealt with internationally, and outline some reasons for convergence 
and divergence. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Directors’ liability is a contentious area, and much has been written on 
the subject of whether directors should be personally liable for corporate 
faults and defaults.1  The new Australian government’s stated aim2 is to 
                                                 
*  Associate Professor and Head of Department, Department of Business Law and Taxation, Monash 
University, Australia.  This article arose from the compilation of a book entitled DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR 
CORPORATE FAULT (Helen Anderson ed., 2008).  I would like to acknowledge the contributions of the 
authors to that book:  Karen Wheelwright (Austl.); Prof. Janis Sarra (Can.); Chenxia Shi and Prof. Hu Bin 
(P.R.C.); Prof. Cristina Mauro (Fr.); Prof. Paul von Nessen, Prof. Say H. Goo and Assoc. Prof. Low Chee 
Keong (H.K.); Prof. Ok-Rial Song (S. Korea); Dr. Janine Pascoe (Malay.); Dr. Chris Noonan and Assoc. 
Prof. Susan Watson (N.Z.); Assoc. Prof. Kathleen van der Linde (S. Afr.); Prof. John Lowry (U. K.); and 
Prof. Erik Gerding (U.S.).  While I would like to thank those authors for alerting me to the relevant laws of 
their countries, any mistakes in this article are entirely my responsibility. 
1
  A small selection of these include:  Andrew Keay, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Contractarian 
Concerns Relating to Efficiency and Over-Protection of Creditors, 66 MOD. L. REV. 665 (2003); Rizwaan 
Mokal, On Fairness and Efficiency, 66 MOD. L. REV. 452 (2003); David Wishart, Models and Theories of 
Directors’ Duties to Creditors, 14 N. Z. UNIVERSITIES L. REV. 323 (1991); Ross Grantham, Directors’ 
Duties and Insolvent Companies, 54 MOD. L. REV. 576 (1991); Judith Freedman, Limited Liability: Large 
Company Theory and Small Firms, 63 MOD. L. REV. 317 (2000); Jonathan Lipson, Directors’ Duties to 
Creditors: Power Imbalance and the Financially Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189 (2003); 
Mark Van der Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (1996); 
Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock & Stuart Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in 
Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L. J. 117 (1980); Len Sealy, Directors’ “Wider” Responsibilities—
Problems Conceptual, Practical and Procedural, 13 MONASH U. L. REV. 164 (1987); David Cohen, 
Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability Company: How Should Courts and Legislatures 
Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility and Securities Regulation for the Limited 
Liability Company, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 427 (1998). 
2
  See Dr. Ken Henry, Keynote Address to ASIC Summer School, Melbourne (Feb. 19, 2008), 
available at 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1346/HTML/docshell.asp?URL=Ministers_Speech_to_ASIC_Sum
mer_School.htm.  Dr. Henry is the Secretary to the Australian Treasury, and gave this speech on behalf of 
The Hon. Nick Sherry, Minister for Superannuation and Corporate Law. 
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review the matter to determine whether liability is imposed appropriately 
and effectively. 
The aim of this article is to show ways in which other countries deal 
with some of the corporate law problems which Australia faces.  This article 
does not seek to analyse these laws to conclude that they are superior or 
inferior to the Australian ones.  It has three objectives.  First, it highlights the 
diversity of directors’ liability law internationally, and makes and illustrates 
two simple but often overlooked points—first, that there is more than one 
way in which a regulatory objective can be achieved, and second, that some 
economies appear to function perfectly well without any law at all on a 
particular matter where such law seems essential elsewhere.  
One might assume in this era of globalization that there would be 
greater uniformity.  Perhaps it is not surprising that emerging economies 
such as China and South Korea do not have the same body of law as the 
Commonwealth jurisdictions.  But it is remarkable to find that Canada has 
stringent laws imposing liability on directors for unpaid wages of employees 
but not for trading insolvently, whereas the United Kingdom is the direct 
opposite.3  The United States lacks both and Australia has both.4  
Nonetheless, there are areas of the law where there is a considerable degree 
of similarity.5 
The article’s second objective is to show that where there is a 
legislative will to impose stringent liability on directors, it can be done, and 
has been done, in fairly harsh terms and in a variety of political and 
economic climates.  This serves to discount the suggestion that governments 
should not legislate to impose onerous liability on directors, because it will 
result in suitable businesspeople being reluctant to take directorships or will 
make them overly risk-averse, to the detriment of economic growth, when 
holding such positions. 
This point goes to the issue of why liability is imposed at all.  In 
simplistic terms it is imposed to deter acknowledged forms of undesirable 
conduct and to compensate parties adversely affected by the behavior in 
question.  Yet all parties adversely affected by undesirable conduct on the 
part of directors are not given the same rights of redress, and more 
remarkably for the purpose of this article, this unequal treatment is repeated 
in many jurisdictions.  The international overview conducted by this article 
leads to the article’s third objective, which is to suggest that there is some 
degree of correlation between the protection of powerful corporate 
                                                 
3
  This liability is called wrongful trading in the United Kingdom.  See infra Part III.A and III.B. 
4
  See infra Part III.A and III.B. 
5
  See infra Part II. 
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stakeholders, the strictness of laws to protect these stakeholders, and the 
similarity of those laws across the jurisdictions selected for examination.  
Conversely, the protection of vulnerable stakeholder groups is done through 
case law and legislation which is both diverse and generally lenient.  
This article is divided into Parts.  Part II gives some examples of 
similarity of laws, although even in such cases, there is no generally 
accepted template for their format or even adoption across all the 
jurisdictions surveyed.  While many areas of director liability could have 
been looked at, three areas—capital raising, unremitted employee tax 
deductions, and protection of the environment—have been chosen to 
demonstrate the objectives outlined above.  These neatly illustrate the way in 
which powerful but different cohorts of corporate stakeholders—investors, 
the government, and a vocal and well-supported lobby group—are protected 
by the law. 
Part III then looks at some instances of diversity of laws.  These have 
been chosen because they show the treatment of particularly vulnerable 
stakeholder groups.  The Part begins with insolvent trading, where there are 
considerable differences among countries.  Next, it looks at the protection of 
employee entitlements, where many countries have not legislated at all.  
Finally, it concludes with the tortious liability of directors qua directors, 
where the law is unsettled and contentious even within jurisdictions. 
A wide variety of countries is surveyed to get a broad overview of the 
international picture.  While they are countries from many parts of the 
world, no claims are made that they are typical or representative of their 
geographical region or their form of government.  In addition, the article 
does not profess to have captured all forms of legislation possible. 
Inevitably, the question arises—why have some jurisdictions found it 
necessary to impose liability in certain situations and in certain ways, where 
other jurisdictions apparently function well with different laws or no law at 
all?  Part IV speculates as to what these reasons might be.  While it is 
beyond the scope of this article to try to answer this definitively, the article 
reflects upon some possible reasons for similarity and diversity.  Part V 
concludes the article. 
II. SIMILARITY IN DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY LAWS BETWEEN JURISDICTIONS 
This Part examines three areas of the law which show marked 
similarities across the jurisdictions selected.  As noted in the introduction, a 
number of different areas could have been chosen to illustrate the point.  
Capital raising, recovery of unremitted taxation installments, and protection 
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of the environment were selected because they represent a range of powerful 
stakeholder interests.  What is noteworthy from an examination of the 
legislation governing these areas across the jurisdictions surveyed is the 
stringency of the laws and the degrees to which they adopt a common form 
of words and structure.  
A. Similarities in Capital Raising Laws Across Selected Jurisdictions 
Raising money is an essential operation for companies, and ensuring 
investor confidence in the process has become a key aspect of most 
jurisdictions’ corporate legislation.  The information on which the 
fundraising bid is based comes from directors and other corporate officers 
and experts.  Substantial losses can be caused to investors and damage to 
market confidence in general if funds are raised based on false or misleading 
information, or incomplete information.  It is this necessity for financing that 
makes prospective investors powerful corporate stakeholders who can 
demand considerable legislative protection.   
As a result, most jurisdictions around the world, regardless of the 
form of their economy or government, require companies to issue 
prospectuses or other disclosure documentation to raise funds from the 
public.  Legislation imposes liability on parties, including directors, for 
errors in, or omissions from, that documentation, subject to a similar range 
of defences.  Liability is relatively harsh.  One of the reasons for the degree 
of similarity could be that countries want access to the international market 
for capital.  Stringent and familiar-looking liability laws give confidence to 
investors seeking to expand into an international location.  
Australia6 has long had laws dealing with capital raising and imposing 
liability on directors for misleading statements in relation to the offering of 
securities.7  To prevent the inclusion of misleading information in the offer 
and issue of securities by public companies, the Corporations Act 2001 
contains extensive provisions for the public disclosure of information.8  The 
offer must be made via a disclosure document9 in the form of a prospectus, 
                                                 
6
  See Karen Wheelwright, Australia, in DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULT (Helen 
Anderson ed., 2008) (forthcoming 2008). 
7
  See, e.g., Securities Industry Code, 1981, § 107 (Austl.) (effective July 1981). 
8
  Corporations Act, 2001, §§ 710-716 (Austl.). 
9
  Id. § 710 (“A prospectus for a body's securities must contain all the information that investors and 
their professional advisers would reasonably require to make an informed assessment of the matters set out 
in the table below.”).  In relation to an offer to issue shares, the matters to be disclosed under that section 
include “the rights and liabilities attaching to the securities offered; the assets and liabilities, financial 
position and performance, profits and losses and prospects of the body that is to issue (or issued) the shares, 
debentures or interests.” 
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an offer information statement or a profile statement,10 and must not include 
a misleading or deceptive statement11 or fail to include specified 
information.12  Section 729 contains a table outlining the parties who may be 
liable to those who suffered loss.13  This table includes directors, whether or 
not they committed or were involved in the contravention, although defences 
are available.14  In addition, the purchaser of the security may return it for a 
refund, and if this is not forthcoming from the company, the directors are 
personally liable for this amount.15  There are also criminal penalties 
applicable.16 
By contrast, in Canada,17 another federal jurisdiction, there is no 
federal securities law statute.18  There are, however, provincial and territorial 
securities laws in Canada which impose particular obligations on directors of 
publicly traded corporations.  In Ontario, for example, under the Ontario 
Securities Act (1990), a purchaser of securities has the right to seek damages 
from directors where the plaintiff can establish there was a 
misrepresentation.19  This right exists, regardless of whether the purchaser 
relied on the misrepresentation.20  Directors are jointly and severally liable.21  
Defences available include due diligence,22 knowledge by the plaintiff of the 
misrepresentation which did not therefore cause loss,23 reasonable grounds 
                                                 
10
  Id. § 709(4).  An offer information statement, instead of a prospectus, can be used for capital 
raisings of $10 million or less.  Profile statements are governed by § 709(2). 
11
  Id. § 728(1). 
12
  See id. §§ 710-15. 
13
  Id. § 729. 
14
  See, e.g., id. § 731 (due diligence, which is proved by forming a belief on reasonable grounds after 
making reasonable enquiries); § 732 (lack of knowledge, which is available only in relation to offer 
information statements and profile statements); § 733 (reasonable reliance upon information from someone 
other than an employee or agent, where the director caused all due enquiries to me made; this defence is 
available for all disclosure documents). 
15
  Id. § 737(3). 
16
  See id. § 1311, § 1483 (Schedule 3). 
17
  See Janis Sarra, Canada, in DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULT (Helen Anderson ed., 
2008) (forthcoming 2008). 
18
  There are 13 jurisdictions in Canada, as well as a federal jurisdiction.  See Canadian Legal 
Information Institute, http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/. 
19 
 Securities Act, R.S.O., ch. S-5, § 130(1)(c) (1990) (Can.) (Ont.).  Under § 1(1) of this Act, 
“‘misrepresentation’ means (a) an untrue statement of material fact, or (b) an omission to state a material 
fact that is required to be stated or that is necessary to make a statement not misleading in the light of the 
circumstances in which it was made.” 
20
  See id. § 130(1).  
21
  Id. § 130(8).  
22 
 See id. § 130(3), (5). 
23 
 See id. § 130(2), (7). 
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for believing an expert’s opinion,24 or lack of consent or withdrawal of 
consent to the filing of the prospectus.25  
In addition, four provinces in Canada26 have now enacted a statutory 
civil liability regime for misrepresentation or failure to disclose to secondary 
market participants.  These provisions give secondary market investors a 
right of action against issuers and key related persons in relation to public 
misrepresentations or material omissions as required by securities law.  
Secondary market participants claiming under these provisions need only to 
show that they acquired or disposed of the company's securities during the 
period between the time the misrepresentation or omission occurred and the 
time that it was corrected.27 
In New Zealand,28 capital raising is regulated by its Securities Act of 
1978.  A registered prospectus is required for securities offerings to the 
public,29 failing which the offer is rendered void and the amounts subscribed 
must be repaid.30  Joint and several liability may be imposed on directors 
where these repayments are not made,31 although a defence is available to 
the director upon proof of lack of personal default or negligence.32  Civil 
liability, in the form of compensation orders33 or pecuniary penalties,34 is 
provided for in relation to untrue statements in advertisements and registered 
prospectuses.  Subscribers may apply for compensation orders if they 
subscribed “on the faith of an advertisement or registered prospectus that 
includes an untrue statement, for the loss or damage that the persons have 
sustained by reason of the untrue statement.”35  Defences are available under 
                                                 
24
  Id. § 130(3)(c). 
25
  Id. § 130(3)(a), (b). 
26
  See Securities Act, R.S.O., ch. S-5 (1990) (Can.) (Ont.); Securities Act, R.S.A., ch. S-4, Part 17.01 
(2006) (Can.) (Alta.); Securities Act, R.S.M., ch. 18 (1987) (Can.) (Man.); Securities Act, c.S-42.2, Part 
XVIII, (1988) (Can.) (Sask.). 
27
  Securities Act, R.S.O., ch. S-5, § 138.5 (1990) (Can.) (Ont.); Securities Act, R.S.A., ch. S-4, Part 
17.01, § 211.05 (2006) (Can.) (Alta.); Securities Act, R.S.M., ch. 18, § 188(1) (1987) (Can.) (Man.); 
Securities Act, c.S-42.2, Part XVIII, § 136.21(1) (1988) (Can.) (Sask.).  Other features of the new 
legislation include a reverse burden of proof in relation to misrepresentations in “core” documents and 
proportional liability in certain circumstances. 
28
  See Chris Noonan & Susan Watson, New Zealand, in DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE 
FAULT (Helen Anderson ed., 2008) (forthcoming 2008). 
29
  Securities Act 1978, 1978 S.N.Z. No. 103, § 37 (N.Z.) (as amended). 
30
  Id. § 37(5).  
31
  Id. § 37(6). 
32
  See, e.g., Alexander v. De Lacy, [1992] 6 N.Z.C.L.C. 68,020 (H.C.); Reuhman v. Paape, [2002] 9 
N.Z.C.L.C. 262,988 (C.A.); Robinson v. Tait, [2001] 2 N.Z.L.R.30 (C.A.).  
33
  Securities Act 1978, 1978 S.N.Z. No. 103 § 55G (N.Z.) (as amended). 
34
  Id. § 55C. 
35
  Id. § 55G(1). 
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§ 56.36  Directors may also be criminally liable pursuant to § 58(1) of the 
Securities Act of 1978.37 
China38 has had a long-standing problem with false statements, 
misleading disclosure and market manipulation,39 and has recently made 
significant improvements to the legislation dealing with these matters.  
Companies listed on stock exchanges in China are prohibited from including 
false or misleading information or omitting material information in 
disclosure documents.40  Recent amendments have strengthened civil, 
administrative, and criminal liabilities against persons who contravene 
statutory provisions dealing with false statements.41  
While the emphasis has been on punishment rather than compensation 
of parties affected by the conduct,42 investors’ actions against directors who 
have been administratively sanctioned or found liable in a criminal 
proceeding are allowed by the Supreme People’s Court Rules.43  The liability 
imposed on directors, which is joint with the company, is based on personal 
fault.44  Examples of such fault include where they participate in making 
false statements, or know or ought to know about the false statement but do 
not act to prevent its publication.45 
South Africa46 has both criminal and civil provisions dealing with 
disclosure when shares are offered to the public.47  A director is liable to 
compensate persons who relied on the prospectus and acquired shares.48  
                                                 
36
  Id. § 56.  These include the absence or withdrawal of consent to be a director or to the distribution 
or registration of the advertisement or prospectus, or reasonable grounds to believe that statements made on 
the authority of an expert or in a public officials document were true. 
37
  Id. § 58(1). 
38
  See Chenxia Shi & Hu Bin, China, in DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULT (Helen 
Anderson ed., 2008) (forthcoming 2008). 
39 
 See Zhiwu Chen, Capital Markets and Legal Development: The China Case, 14 CHINA ECON. 
REV. 451, 459-64 (2003). 
40 
 See Securities Law, ch. 3 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 
2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter P.R.C. Securities Law]. 
41
  See id. art. 69; Company Law, art. 150, 153 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Oct. 27,2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) (P.R.C.); Amendments to the Criminal Law, art. V 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 26, 2006, effective June 26, 2006) 
(P.R.C.). 
42
  See P.R.C. Securities Law, art. 191, 193. 
43 
 Supreme People’s Court Rules, arts. 26, 27, 28 (P.R.C.). 
44
  Supreme People’s Court Rules, arts. 21, 22, 23, 24 25 (P.R.C.). 
45 
 Liability is also extended to situations where directors should assume responsibility for the false 
statement and its effects.  See Supreme People’s Court Rules, art. 28 (P.R.C.); P.R.C. Securities Law, art. 
63; see also Z. Cui and M. Ma, Directors’ Liability to Shareholders in Cases Concerning False Statements, 
2 CHINA LEGAL STUD. 96 (2003). 
46
  See Kathleen van der Linde, South Africa, in DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULT 
(Helen Anderson ed., 2008) (forthcoming 2008). 
47
  See Companies Act 61 of 1973 ch. VI. (S. Afr.). 
48 
  Id. § 160(2). 
8 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL            VOL. 18 NO. 1 
 
Liability is strict,49 but a series of defences apply.50  Where the company 
fails to refund moneys to investors who have not received the minimum 
subscription51 or where a condition that shares would be listed has not been 
fulfilled,52 directors are criminally and civilly liable.  However, in these 
cases, there is a defence to both civil and criminal liability where the director 
can prove an absence of misconduct or negligence.53  
Under Hong Kong’s54 Companies Ordinance55 “where a company 
allots . . . any shares in or debentures of the company with a view to all or 
any of those shares or debentures being offered for sale to the public, any 
document by which the offer for sale to the public is made shall for all 
purposes be deemed to be a prospectus.”56  Requirements are set out in  
§ 38.57  According to § 41A (a), “a statement included in a prospectus shall 
be deemed to be untrue if it is misleading in the form and context in which it 
is included.”58  Under § 40, directors “shall be liable to pay compensation to 
all persons who subscribe for any shares or debentures on the faith of the 
prospectus for the loss or damage they may have sustained by reason of any 
untrue statement included therein,” subject to defences set out § 40(2).59  
Criminal penalties also apply, subject to defences.60  In addition, § 108 of the 
Securities and Futures Ordinance provides for civil liability where “a person 
makes any fraudulent misrepresentation, reckless misrepresentation or 
negligent misrepresentation by which another person is induced to invest in 
securities or other forms of regulated investments.”61 
                                                 
49
  See id. § 160(1)(a)-(b). 
50 
 See id. § 160(3)(a)–(c), § 162(3)(a)–(c) (providing civil and criminal defences if the director 
reasonably believed in the accuracy of the information in the prospectus); § 160(3)(c)(ii)–(iii),  
§ 162(4)(b)–(c) (providing civil and criminal defences if the director did not consent to the issuance of the 
prospectus and, upon learning that the prospectus was issued without their consent, gave reasonable public 
notice of this fact, or that, after that consented to the issue of the prospectus, upon becoming aware that it 
contained an untrue statement, they withdrew their consent and gave reasonable public notice of the 
withdrawal and the reason therefore). 
51
  Id. § 165(5)-(6). 
52 
  Id. § 169(4)(b) and (5)(a). 
53
  Id. § 165(5)(b) and § 169(5)(b). 
54
  See Say H. Goo et al., Hong Kong, in DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULT (Helen 
Anderson ed., 2008) (forthcoming 2008). 
55
  Companies Ordinance, (1990) Cap. 32.  (H.K.). 
56
  Id. § 41(1). 
57
  Id. § 38. 
58
  Id. § 41. 
59
  Id. § 40(1)(a), 40(2).  Defences include withdrawal of consent, reasonable grounds for belief that 
the statement was true, reliance on experts whose competence they had no grounds to doubt, and reliance 
on public documents. 
60 
  Id. § 40A, sched. 12. 
61
  Securities and Futures Ordinance, (2003) Cap. 571 § 108.  (H.K.). 
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The United States of America enacted the Securities Act of 1933 as a 
result of the market crash of 1929.62  The legislation’s two main goals were 
to ensure more transparency in financial statements so investors could make 
informed decisions about investments, and to establish laws against 
misrepresentation and fraudulent activities in the securities markets.63  
Section 11(a)(2) of the Act provides for the liability of directors to acquirers 
of securities for untrue statements or material omissions in registration 
statements.  Defences are available under  
§ 11(b), including resignation from the role, lack of knowledge about the 
registration statement, and reasonable belief in the opinion of experts. 
In Malaysia,64 capital raising and disclosure of information is now 
regulated by the Capital Markets and Services Act (2007).65  Prospectuses 
must be registered66 and contain specified information.67  Pursuant to  
§ 246, it is an offense for a person to “authorise or cause the issue of 
prospectus”68 which contains any statement or information that is false or 
misleading or which omits material information, violation of which is 
punishable by fine or imprisonment.  Civil compensation is available but 
only where the investors’ loss has been caused by reliance on the 
prospectus.69  Defences include due diligence,70 reasonable reliance on 
another person such as a competent person,71 and lack of consent,72 although 
the latter is arguably superfluous, as the words of § 246 itself connote an 
                                                 
62
  See Erik Gerding, United States, in DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULT (Helen 
Anderson ed., 2008) (forthcoming 2008). 
63
  See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2008); see also Krista L. Turnquist, Pleading 
Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2395, 2404-05 (2000). 
64
  See Janine Pascoe, Malaysia, in DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULT (Helen Anderson 
ed., 2008) (forthcoming 2008). 
65
  See Capital Markets and Services Act, (2007) (Malay.).  The preamble to this Act states that it is 
an “Act to consolidate the Securities Industry Act 1983 [Act 280] and Futures Industry Act 1993 [Act 499], 
to regulate and to provide for matters relating to the activities, markets and intermediaries in the capital 
markets, and for matters consequential and incidental thereto.” 
66
  See id. Part VI, §§ 232-33. 
67
  Id. § 236(1).  This is defined to be “all such information that investors and their professional 
advisers would reasonably require, and reasonably expect to find in the prospectus,” which is further 
defined in § 236(2) as information known to a wide list of persons connected to the company.  Section 
236(3) provides a list of factors relevant to the determination of the appropriate contents of the prospectus. 
68
  Id. § 246. 
69
  See id. § 248, Part XI, § 357. 
70
  Id. § 250. 
71
  Id. § 251. 
72
  Id. § 254. 
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active participation by “authorising or causing the issue of the prospectus.”73  
Some conduct also attracts criminal liability.74 
In the United Kingdom,75 capital raising is governed by the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000.  The duty of disclosure requires the 
prospectus or listing particulars to:  
contain all such information as investors and their professional 
advisors would reasonably require, and reasonably expect to 
find there, for the purposes of making an informed assessment 
of—(a) the assets and liabilities, financial position, profits and 
losses, and the prospects of the issuer of the securities; and (b) 
the rights attaching to the securities.76  
The Act provides a compensation remedy to persons who have suffered loss 
as a result of any untrue or misleading statement in the relevant document or 
any the omission from the particulars of any matter required to be 
included.77  Defences are available under Schedule 10 of the Act. 
In South Korea,78 there has been a process of legislative consolidation, 
and the capital raising provisions are now located in the Capital Market and 
Financial Investment Act, which was passed in August 2007.  This Act 
provides that where there are false or misleading statements or omissions 
about material information in prospectuses used to offer securities to the 
public, directors may be liable to purchasers for damages incurred as a 
result.79  A due diligence defence applies.  Directors may also be subject to 
criminal liabilities for failure of the duty to disclose.80 
In France,81 directors can be held liable under civil, criminal and 
administrative provisions in relation to the issue of securities.  The markets 
are protected by an independent agency, the Autorité des Marchés Financiers 
                                                 
73
  Id. § 246. 
74
  See id. § 243(12). 
75
  J. Lowry, United Kingdom, in DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULT (Helen Anderson 
ed., 2008) (forthcoming 2008). 
76
  Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, § 80 (U.K.). 
77
  Id. § 90. 
78
  O. Song, South Korea, in DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULT (Helen Anderson ed., 
2008) (forthcoming 2008). 
79
  [Capital Market and Financial Investment Act] § 125 (S. KOR.). 
80
  Id. § 444. 
81
  C. Mauro, France, in DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE FAULT (Helen Anderson ed., 2008) 
(forthcoming 2008). 
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(“AMF”).  While the Code de commerce deals with disclosures for listed 
companies,82 the Code monetaire et financier provides for liability for: 
[W]hoever carries out or attempts to carry out, directly or 
through an intermediary, a manoeuvre intended to impede the 
normal operation of a regulated market by misleading others 
[or] . . . publicly disseminates, via whatever channel or means, 
any false or deceptive information concerning the prospects or 
the situation of an issuer whose securities are traded on a 
regulated market, or the likely performance of a financial 
instrument admitted to trading on a regulated market, which 
might affect the price thereof.83  
In summary, all the jurisdictions surveyed require some form of disclosure 
document when companies seek to raise funds from the public.  All impose 
liability on directors for false statements and omissions in the 
documentation, most being strict liability subject to defences and a few 
requiring fault.  The defences also showed marked similarities, including 
due diligence, reasonable reliance on the advice of experts and lack of 
consent to the statement.  These liability provisions impose a considerable 
burden on directors to ensure that correct and complete information is 
provided to prospective investors. 
B.  Similarities in Unremitted Employee Tax Installment Laws Across 
Selected Jurisdictions  
In many jurisdictions, companies act as tax collectors by retaining 
from employees’ wages an amount representing the employees’ taxation 
obligations with respect to those wages.  This is then remitted to the relevant 
revenue authority and credited to the tax liability of those employees.  When 
money is in short supply, a company can be tempted to treat these tax 
installments as working capital to finance its operations, rather than 
remitting them as required.  If the company trades out of its financial 
difficulties, no harm is done.  However, if the company becomes insolvent 
and fails, the loss either falls on the employee or the revenue authority.  To 
deter this behavior, and to provide compensation when it does occur, many 
jurisdictions have now legislated to impose quite harsh liability on directors 
for these unremitted tax installments. 
                                                 
82
  C. COM. art. 242-6-2 (Fr.) imposes criminal liability for directors who give false information 
relating to the financial position of the company, with the aim of hiding the truth.  For the English language 
version of French legislation, see http://195.83.177.9/code/index.phtml?lang=uk. 
83
   C. MONETAIRE ET FINANCIER art. L465-2 (Fr.). 
12 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL            VOL. 18 NO. 1 
 
Australia84 has seen some significant increases in the liability for 
directors for their own actions over the past fifteen years.  One of the most 
noteworthy is the imposition of personal liability for taxation installments 
which the company has failed to remit.  Briefly,85 since 1993, Australian 
company directors have been potentially liable for the unremitted 
installments of tax which they deduct from workers’ salaries, amongst other 
things, in the event that their company does not pay them in a timely 
manner.86  The Australian Taxation Office (“ATO”) gives the directors 
written notice of a “penalty,” equal to the amount of the unremitted tax owed 
by the company.87  The director then has fourteen days to cause the company 
to comply with its tax obligations or to undertake one of a number of other 
specified actions,88 failing which, the director will become personally liable 
to pay the amount of the penalty.  While a number of defences exist, they are 
difficult to establish.89  In addition, even if the director causes the company 
to pay the unremitted installments to the ATO in the lead-up to insolvency, 
the director will be personally liable to the Commissioner of Taxation for the 
debt if the liquidator successfully claws back this preferential payment from 
the ATO.90 
While the introduction of these laws in 1993 caused some concern 
amongst commentators,91 Australia is now in line with many other parts of 
the world.  For example, in Canada,92 directors may be jointly and severally 
liable with the corporation for the company’s failure to deduct and remit 
employees’ installments of income tax.93  Directors can avail themselves of a 
                                                 
84
  See Wheelwright, supra note 6. 
85
  These provisions are discussed in more detail in other publications.  See Stephen Barkoczy & Mei-
Ling Barkoczy, Directors’ Liability and the New Regime for Collecting Unremitted Tax Instalments, 6 
REVENUE L. J. 147 (1996); Christopher Symes, Reminiscing the Taxation Priorities in Insolvency, [2005] J. 
OF THE AUSTRALIAN TAX TEACHERS ASS’N 23 (2005); Patricia Blazey, Non Payment of Pay As You Go 
Withholding Tax and the Implications for Company Directors, [2006] J. OF THE AUSTRALASIAN TAX 
TEACHERS ASS’N 29 (2006); Helen Anderson, Directors’ Liability for Unpaid Employee Entitlements—
Suggestions for Reform Based on their Liabilities for Unremitted Taxes, 30(3) SYDNEY L. REV. 470 (2008). 
86
  Income Tax Assessment Act, 1936, § 222AOB-222AQD (Austl.). 
87 
 Id. § 222AOE. 
88
  Under Income Tax Assessment Act, 1936, § 222AOB(1) (Austl.), these include entering into a 
repayment agreement pursuant to § 222ALA, placing the company into administration, or winding the 
company up. 
89
  See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1995) 95 ATC 4587, 4590 (Austl.).  
See also Barkoczy, supra note 85. 
90
  Corporations Act, 2001, § 588FGA (Austl.).  This is subject to a number of defences under  
§ 588FGB. 
91
  See sources cited supra note 85. 
92
  See Sarra, supra note 17. 
93 
 Income Tax Act, R.S.C., ch. 1 § 227.1 (1985) (Can.), as amended:  “(1) Where a corporation has 
failed to deduct or withhold an amount as required . . . . has failed to remit such an amount or has failed to 
pay an amount of tax . . . , the directors of the corporation at the time the corporation was required to 
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due diligence defence94 where they have exercised the degree of care, 
diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised to 
prevent the failure in comparable circumstances.  Directors’ liability ceases 
two years after directors cease to hold a directorship.95 
In South Africa, the Income Tax Act 1962 provides for strict liability 
on the part of directors with respect to unremitted employee tax installments.  
It provides that “[w]here an employer is a company, every shareholder and 
director who controls or is regularly involved in the management of the 
company’s overall financial affairs shall be personally liable for the 
employees’ tax, additional tax, penalty or interest for which the company is 
liable.”96  There is no director liability for other unpaid taxes, with the 
exception of value added tax.  No defences are available.  
In New Zealand,97 joint and several liability can be imposed on 
directors for the income tax of a company.  Section HD15(1) of the Income 
Tax Act 2007 deals with arrangements entered into by companies which 
prevent them from meeting their tax obligations.  For the section to apply the 
purpose of the arrangement must have been to have this effect, and then only 
if, had “a director of the company at the time of the arrangement made 
reasonable inquiries, they could have anticipated at the time that the income 
tax liability would, or would likely, be required to be met.”98  Liability is 
subject to some exclusions99 and defences.100  Section 141F of the Tax 
Administration Act of 1994 also states that where any shortfall penalty is 
imposed on a company and where a director fails to fulfill specified 
responsibilities under taxation law, he or she may be held liable for a portion 
of that shortfall penalty. 
                                                                                                                                               
deduct, withhold, remit or pay the amount are jointly and severally, or solidarily, liable, together with the 
corporation, to pay that amount and any interest or penalties relating to it.”  Liability is subject under 
subsection 2 to the corporation’s inability to pay, as evidence by unsatisfied execution of a registered 
liability, its liquidation or assignment or bankruptcy order. 
94 
 Income Tax Act, R.S.C., ch. 1 § 227.1(3) (1985) (Can.) (as amended). 
95
  Id. ch. 1 § 227.1(4). 
96 
 Income Tax Act of 1962 R.S.A. Sched. IV, s. 16(2C) (S. Afr.). 
97
  See Noonan & Watson, supra note 28. 
98
  Income Tax Act 2007, 2005 S.N.Z. No. 97, § HD15(1)(c)(ii) (N.Z.). 
99
  Id. § HD 15(2). 
100
  Id. § HD15(3) provides that:  “All persons who are directors of the company at the time the 
arrangement is entered into are treated as agents of the company in relation to the tax obligation, and the 
liability is joint and several.  But a director has no liability if—(a) they do not derive a benefit from the 
arrangement, and at the first reasonable opportunity after becoming aware of the arrangement, or the 
aspects of the arrangement that cause this section to apply to it, they record formally their dissent in relation 
to the arrangement with the company and with the Commissioner; or (b) they were not at the relevant time 
involved in the executive management of the company and had no knowledge of the arrangement, or the 
aspects of the arrangement that cause this section to apply to it.” 
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Some countries require an element of fault on the part of the director.  
For example, in the United States,101 § 6672(a) of the Internal Revenue Code 
1954 provides that: 
[A]ny person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay 
over any tax . . . . who willfully fails to collect such tax, or 
truthfully account for and pay over such tax, …. shall, in 
addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a 
penalty equal to the total amount of the tax . . . not accounted 
for and paid over. 102  
The Internal Revenue Code requires that employers withhold federal income 
taxes and social security taxes from their employees' wages.103  Because the 
employer holds these taxes as “special fund[s] in trust for the United 
States”,104 the withheld amounts are commonly referred to as “trust fund 
taxes.”105  While an employer remains liable for its failure to remit trust fund 
taxes, the Internal Revenue Code also imposes personal liability, in an 
amount equal to an employer's deficient taxes, upon those officers or 
employees responsible for collecting, accounting for, and remitting payroll 
taxes, who willfully fail to do so.106 
In France, any director, whether formally appointed or de facto, of any 
corporation, is jointly liable with the corporation for the payment of any tax, 
if, by fraudulent tactics or serious and repeated violations of tax law, he 
makes the collection of taxes impossible.107  Case law has established a 
number of generous defences.108  In Malaysia,109 the Director-General of 
Inland Revenue may ignore transactions which have the direct or indirect 
effect of avoiding or evading tax, pursuant to  
§ 140(1) of the Income Tax Act.   
By contrast, in South Korea,110 directors are not liable, although 
interestingly, shareholders who receive a distribution of the company’s 
                                                 
101
  See Gerding, supra note 62. 
102
  See United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268 (1978). 
103
  26 U.S.C. §§ 3402(a), 3102(a) (2006). 
104
  26 U.S.C. § 7501(a) (2006). 
105
  Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 243 (1978). 
106
  See 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) (2006); 26 U.S.C. § 6671(b) (2006); see also O'Connor v. United States, 
956 F.2d 48, 50 (4th Cir. 1992) (outlining elements of 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (2006) liability). 
107
  Livre des procédures fiscales, July 26, 2005, art. L 267 (Fr.). 
108
  These include that even if formally appointed, the director was not assuming in fact the direction 
of the corporation; Cass. com., March 3, 2004, RJF 7/04, No. 792; that he had delegated his powers in the 
tax field to another person; Cass. com., April 25, 2006, BF 8--9/06, Inf. 951; or that the tax was not due at 
the time he was managing the corporation; id. 
109
  See Pascoe, supra note 64. 
110
  See Song, supra note 78. 
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residual assets when the company is wound up may be liable as secondary 
tax debtors for unremitted taxes,111 as may the shareholders in family-owned 
companies.112  Likewise, China’s new Enterprise Income Taxation Law113 
passed in 2007 does not impose any liability on directors for unpaid 
corporate tax debts.  
Similarly, in the United Kingdom,114 directors are not liable for 
unremitted taxes.  The only liability which might be imposed in such cases is 
for misfeasance and disqualification on the grounds of “unfitness” under the 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
In summary, some of the jurisdictions surveyed impose liability on 
directors for unremitted taxation installments.  Notably, the similarity, in 
form or substance, present in laws relation to capital raising, does not exist 
in unremitted taxation installments.  Some countries such as Australia, South 
Africa, and Canada, impose strict liability, with Australian and Canada 
allowing defences.  Other countries, such as France and the United States, 
require proof of fault.  Some countries have no law at all in this area. 
In many countries, in order to protect the revenue base and the 
operations of government, taxation legislation traditionally is onerous.  
However, as a corporate stakeholder, the revenue authority is the most 
highly diversified creditor imaginable, and therefore arguably the least 
deserving of harsh protection legislation.  The non-payment of the debts of 
one or more failing companies is unlikely to cause significant financial loss.  
This may explain why some jurisdictions do not impose personal liability on 
directors for the recovery of these amounts.  Nonetheless, liability serves an 
important deterrent function, which may account for the severity of the 
provisions in a number of the jurisdictions surveyed. 
C.  Similarities in Environmental Protection Laws Across Selected 
Jurisdictions 
With increasing discussion of global warming, climate change and 
carbon emissions, and in the wake of some devastating environmental 
disasters caused by corporate misconduct, it is unsurprising that many 
countries have widespread environment protection legislation.  Unlike the 
forms of liability discussed above, the harm caused by breach of 
environment protection laws is not necessarily redressable purely by money 
                                                 
111
  [National Tax Collection Act] art. 34 (S. KOR.). 
112
  [Corporate Tax Code] art. 2, Item 10 (S. KOR.). 
113 
 Enterprise Income Taxation Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Mar. 16, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) (P.R.C.). 
114
  See Lowry, supra note 75. 
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and often is not limited to a small class of plaintiffs.  Perhaps in recognition 
that deterrence is more important than compensation, the laws examined 
below tend to impose criminal, rather than civil, liability on directors. 
In Australia,115 there is extensive environmental protection 
legislation.116  Some acts impose liability on directors for the faults and 
defaults of their companies.  Directors may face criminal prosecutions under 
state legislation.117  The “positional/managerial” liability model is the most 
common,118 where persons holding certain positions within a company are 
liable for the company’s breach of the law.  Other models of liability include 
positional, managerial, responsible officer, participatory and accessorial.119  
Defences are available under the statutes.120  They differ markedly 
depending on the particular piece of legislation, although most commonly 
include due diligence and the lack of ability of the individual to influence the 
contravention because of the position he or she holds.  
Canada121 is also typified by a multitude of statutes governing 
environmental protection, with more than thirty statutes imposing liability 
on directors for breach.  Personal liability is generally imposed on those 
persons who have charge, management or control of the corporation’s 
activities or property, which occurs if they take an active role in the business 
or if they had a duty or opportunity to take preventive or corrective action 
but failed to do so.122  Directors who authorise, permit, or acquiesce in their 
corporation’s offence will be liable for the same offence pursuant to many 
environmental statutes in Canada.123  The applicable penalties are fines, with 
imprisonment reserved for serious misconduct.124  Liability is strict, with a 
                                                 
115
  See Wheelwright, supra note 6. 
116 
 Examples of federal legislation include Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) Act, 1981 (Austl.); 
Protection of the Sea (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act, 1983 (Austl.); Environment and Heritage 
Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1), 2003 (Austl.); World Heritage Properties Conservation Act, 1983 
(Austl.); Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Act, 1981 (Austl.); Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act, 1999 (Austl.); Hazardous Waste (Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act, 
1989 (Austl.).  
117
  These are set out in Appendix 6 of the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, Personal 
Liability for Corporate Fault Discussion Paper, May 2005, available at http://www.camac.gov.au/ 
camac/camac.nsf/byHeadline/PDFDiscussion+Papers/$file/Personal_Liability_DP_May05.pdf. 
118
  Id. at 33. 
119




  See Sarra, supra note 17. 
122
  See J. Sarra & R. Davis, Director and Officer Liability, in CORPORATE INSOLVENCY (Butterworths 
2002). 
123 
 See e.g., Environmental Protection Act, R.S.C., c. 33 (1999) (Can.). 
124 
 Examples of statutes that include imprisonment as a potential sanction include the Environmental 
Protection Act R.S.C. (1999) (Can.); the Ontario Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. c. E-19 (1990) 
(Can.); the Alberta Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, R.S.A., c. E-12 (2000) (Can.); and the 
British Columbia Water Act, R.S.B.C. c. 483 (1996) (Can.). 
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due diligence defence.125  This includes a requirement to establish proper 
and effective preventative and reporting systems.126  Former directors may 
also be liable, acknowledging the fact that environmental damage may take 
some time to become evident. 127 
China128 has in recent years increased its regulation of the 
environment129 and has embraced international cooperation in environmental 
protection.130  However, there have been a number of impediments to actual 
protection of the environment, including the growth of China’s industry, 
gaps in the legislation and lack of enforcement.  While there is a central 
body131 responsible for environmental protection, local enforcement remains 
with local governments.  While the persons directly responsible for a serious 
environmental pollution accident are subject to administrative sanction,132 
the law does not provide for the joint liability of directors in civil actions to 
pay compensation to parties affected.  However, China’s Criminal Law 
imposes criminal sanctions including fines and imprisonment133 on persons 
directly responsible for violations of environmental law regarding pollution 
and waste control,134 forestry law,135 and mineral resources law.136  
In South Africa,137 the National Environmental Management Act 1998 
imposes criminal and civil liability on directors in an unusual way.  Section 
34(1) provides that: 
Whenever any person is convicted of an offence under any 
provision listed in Schedule 3 and it appears that such person 
has by that offence caused loss or damage to any organ of state 
or other person, including the cost incurred or likely to be 
incurred by an organ of state in rehabilitating the environment 
                                                 
125




 See e.g., Environmental Management Act, S.B.C., c. 53, § 47(1) (2003). 
128
  See Chenxia Shi & Hu Bin, supra note 38. 
129
  The National People's Congress has since 1949 passed 9 laws on environmental protection and 15 
laws on the protection of natural resources.  See Environmental Protection in China (1996-2005), a white 
paper released by the State Council in June 2006, available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/ 
MATERIAL/170257.htm. 
130 
 China has acceded to more than 50 international conventions on environmental protection.  See id.  
131
  The State Environmental Protection Administration (“SEPA”). 
132 
 Environmental Protection Law (1989) art. 38 (promulgated by Order No. 22 of the President of the 
P.R.C., Dec. 26, 1989, effective on the date of promulgation) (P.R.C.). 
133 
 Criminal Law (1999) arts. 338-346 (promulgated by Order No. 83 of the President of the P.R.C., 
Mar. 14, 1997.adopted by the Second Session of the Fifth Nat’l People’s Cong., Jul. 1, 1979, amended at 
the Fifth Session of the Eighth Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14, 1997) (P.R.C.) 
134 
 Id. arts. 338 and 339. 
135 
 Id. art. 344. 
136 
 Id. art. 343. 
137
  Van der Linde, supra note 46. 
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or preventing damage to the environment, the court 
may . . . inquire summarily and without pleadings into the 
amount of the loss or damage so caused. 
Directors are named in subsection 8 as parties who may be so convicted.  
Subsection 7 states that directors are guilty “if the offence in question 
resulted from the failure of the director to take all reasonable steps that were 
necessary under the circumstances to prevent the commission of the 
offence”; the burden of disproving this lies with the director.138 
In the United Kingdom,139 protection of the environment is governed 
mainly by the Environmental Protection Act 1990.140  The HM Inspectorate 
of Pollution or the local authority Environmental Health Officer may take 
action against directors, as well as the company, for breaches of the law.141  
Criminal penalties include both fines and imprisonment, as well as 
disqualification from acting as a director.142 
In Hong Kong,143 there are a range of ordinances imposing criminal 
liability for damage to the environment, or failure to protect the natural and 
cultural environment.144  In addition, future impact on the environment is 
                                                 
138
  National Environmental Management Act of 1998 s. 34(7) (S. Afr.) concludes with the words:  
“Provided that proof of the said offence by the firm shall constitute prima facie evidence that the director is 
guilty under this subsection.” 
139
  Lowry, supra note 75. 
140
  See also Environment Act, 1995, c. 25 (U.K.), The Control of Substances Hazardous to Health 
Regulations, 1999, S.I. 1999/437 (U.K.), and The Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations, 1999, 
S.I. 1999/743 (U.K.). 
141
  This may be done pursuant to the United Kingdom Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, § 
157(1), which provides that:  “Where an offence under any provision of this Act committed by a body 
corporate is proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or to have been attributable 
to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body corporate 
or a person who was purporting to act in any such capacity, he as well as the body corporate shall be guilty 
of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.” 
142 
 The Company Directors Disqualification Act, 1986, c. 46, § 2 (U.K.) provides that the court may, 
in its discretion, issue a “disqualification order against a person convicted of an indictable offence (whether 
on indictment or summarily) in connection with the promotion, formation, management liquidation or 
striking off of a company with the receivership of a company’s property or with his being an administrative 
receiver of a company.”  The offence does not have to relate to the actual management of the company 
provided it was committed in “connection” with its management. 
143
  Goo et al., supra note 54. 
144 
 For damage to the environment, see the Air Pollution Control Ordinance, (1983, as amended 
1991) Cap. 311.  (H.K.); Water Pollution Control Ordinance, (1981) Cap. 358.  (H.K.); Dumping at Sea 
Ordinance, (1995) Cap. 466.  (H.K.); and Merchant Shipping (Prevention and Control of Pollution) 
Ordinance, (1991) Cap. 413.  (H.K.).  For the specific problem of oil pollution, see Merchant Shipping 
(Liability and Compensation for Oil Pollution) Ordinance, (1991) Cap. 414.  (H.K.); Noise Control 
Ordinance, (1989, as amended 1992 and 1996) Cap. 400.  (H.K.); Civil Aviation (Aircraft Noise) 
Ordinance, (1986) Cap. 312.  (H.K.); and Waste Disposal Ordinance, (1980, as amended 1985, 1989, and 
1992) Cap. 354.  (H.K.).  For failure to protect the natural environment, see Animals and Plants (Protection 
of Endangered Species) Ordinance, (1976, as amended 2006) Cap. 187.  (H.K.); Marine Fish Culture 
Ordinance, (1980, as amended 1982) Cap. 353.  (H.K.); Wild Animals Protection Ordinance, (1976) Cap. 
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governed by the Environmental Impact Assessment Ordinance,145 where 
developers must indicate the likely impact of their plans upon the 
environment.  The criminal liability of certain persons, including directors of 
companies, is provided for under § 29(1).146 
Malaysia147 also has environmental laws, such as the Environmental 
Quality Act 1974, which impose criminal liability upon directors for 
breaches committed by their companies.  Section 43(1) of the Act deems 
directors to be liable for the environmental offences of their company unless 
one of the defences contained in that subsection applies.148 
In South Korea,149 environmental protection is now heavily 
regulated.150  Companies may be criminally liable for breaches.151  While 
there are no provisions imposing civil liability on companies, directors may 
be liable for the amount of any criminal penalty imposed on their company if 
that penalty is attributable to a breach of the directors’ fiduciary duty, 
dependent on proof of negligence or intent to commit the violation.  
Directors are not liable in the absence of personal fault, even where the 
relevant statute imposes strict liability on the company.152 
The United States153 has the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”).154  This federal statute, 
                                                                                                                                               
170.  (H.K.);  Whaling Industry (Regulation) Ordinance, (1996) Cap. 496.  (H.K.); and Forests and 
Countryside Ordinance, (1937, as amended 1974) Cap. 96.  (H.K.).  For failure to protect the cultural 
environment, see Antiquities and Monuments Ordinance, (1976) Cap. 53.  (H.K.).  All of the previous are 
available at Hong Kong Ordinances, http://www.hklii.hk/hk/legis/ord/. 
145
  Environmental Impact Assessment Ordinance, (1998) Cap. 499.  (H.K.). 
146
  Hong Kong Environmental Impact Assessment Ordinance, (1998) Cap. 499, § 29(1) provides that:  
“Where a person convicted of an offence under this Ordinance is a body corporate and it is proved that the 
offence was committed with the consent or connivance of, or was attributable to any neglect or omission on 
the part of, a director, manager, secretary or other person concerned in the management of the body 
corporate, the director, manager, secretary or other person also commits the offence.” 
147
  Pascoe, supra note 64. 
148
  Environmental Quality Act, (1974) § 43(1) (Malay.).  These include lack of knowledge and 
consent, and that the directors exercised due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence. 
149
  Song, supra note 78. 
150
  More than 20 laws regulate environmental issues, in areas such as noise, air, soil, water, sewage, 
and the preservation of nature.  See, e.g., [Framework Act on Environmental Policy, Law No. 4257] (1990) 
(S. KOR.) (last revised by Law No. 8471 of 2007); [Clean Air Conservation Act, Law No. 4262] (1990) (S. 
KOR.) (last revised by Law No. 7779 of 2005); [Water Quality Conservation Act, Law No. 7459] (2005) 
(S. KOR.); [Natural Environment Conservation Act, Law No. 7297] (2004)  
(S. KOR) (last revised by Law No. 8468 of 2007); [Soil Environment Conservation Act, Law No. 4906] 
(1995) (S. KOR.) (last revised by Law No. 7459 of 2005).  For a short history of the development of South 
Korean environmental law, see Hong Sik Cho, An Overview of Korean Environmental Law, 29 ENVTL. L. 
501 (1964). 
151
  For instance, [Act on Fundamentals on Environmental Policy] art. 31 (S. KOR.) provides that an 
enterprise must pay damages if the pollution is caused by the enterprise.  See also [Act on Preservation of 
Soil Environment] art. 10-3(1) (S. KOR.). 
152
  [Commercial Code] § 399(1) (S. KOR.). 
153
  Gerding, supra note 62. 
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passed in 1980 following a major environmental disaster,155 imposes 
extensive and complicated liability on directors in relation to land 
contaminated with hazardous waste.  Liability attaches to owners and 
operators, including individual persons, of sites from where such material is 
released into the environment.156  However, courts have taken different 
approaches to the definition of “operators.”  The most common approach has 
been to hold directors liable as “operators” for violations in which they 
directly participate.157  While some courts have held directors liable for 
contraventions of the law where they had the “capacity to control” those 
operations, even if they did not know of, or directly participate in, those 
contraventions,158 Moore notes that “[a] clear majority of courts that have 
considered the issue claim to adhere to a test for "actual control.”159 
In France,160 directors may be criminally liable under the Code de 
l’environnement for a range of crimes.161  These include lesser strict liability 
offences, as well as more serious crimes under the Code de l’environnement 
which require negligence or intent.  An example of the latter is water 
pollution.162 
In summary, while many countries have adopted environmental 
protection laws, the format of the laws differs, most notably in South Africa 
and South Korea.  Some countries, such as Australia and Canada, impose 
both criminal and civil liability based on the position held, but subject to 
defences.  Others confine their reach to criminal liability, with a range of 
fault requirements. 
                                                                                                                                               
154
  42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2008). 
155
  The Love Canal disaster.  See also MICHAEL BROWN, LAYING WASTE: THE POISONING OF 
AMERICA BY TOXIC CHEMICALS (Pantheon Books 1979). 
156
  42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(3) (2008). 
157
  Bryan Moore, The Corporate Officer as CERCLA Operator: Applying the Holding in United 
States v. Bestfoods to the Determination of Officer Liability, 12 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 519, 526-28 (1999).  For 
further discussion of CERCLA’s interaction with corporate law principles, see Lynda J.  Oswald & Cindy 
A. Schipani, CERCLA and the “Erosion” of Traditional Corporate Law Doctrine, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 259 
(1992); Cindy A. Schipani, Integrating Corporate Law Principles with CERCLA Liability for 
Environmental Hazards, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 5 (1993); Gerding, supra note 62. 
158
  This is also known as the “authority to control” test.  See Moore, supra note 157, at 533-40.  He 
distinguishes cases in which courts based director and officer liability determination on whether the 
individual had “actual control” over hazardous substances from those that used an “authority to control” 
test.  Id. 529-40. 
159
  Id. at 529. 
160
  Mauro, supra note 81. 
161
  See, e.g., C. ENVIRONNEMENT arts. L218-20, L218-22, and L218-50. 
162
  Law No. 2000-916 of September 19, 2000, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], September 22, 2000. 
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D.  Conclusion on Similarities of Laws in Selected Jurisdictions 
The discussion above highlights similarities in legislation relating to 
capital raising, unremitted tax installments, and protection of the 
environment, across a range of selected jurisdictions.  There is a general 
obligation on companies to produce disclosure documentation in relation to 
capital offerings to the public, and directors are liable for errors in, and 
omissions from, such documents.  Defences are usually available, but are 
generally limited to due diligence, reliance on the advice of an expert, or 
lack of consent to the issuing of the prospectus.  Nonetheless, there are some 
local variations to both the format of the personal and criminal liability 
provisions and the defences available.  This illustrates the point that there are 
multiple ways for laws to be drafted to meet a common legislative objective. 
This pattern continues for unremitted taxes.  Most, but not all, of the 
countries surveyed have laws making directors liable for the unremitted tax 
installments taken from employees’ wages.  Again, there are defences.  
However, some jurisdictions require some element of intent on the part of 
the directors, making such laws somewhat harder to make out than those 
relating to capital raising.  The diversity between countries is more 
pronounced, and some countries such as the United Kingdom do not 
legislate on this matter at all. 
In relation to the protection of the environment, most of the countries 
surveyed impose criminal liability on directors for their companies’ actions; 
however, not all impose civil liability, and the mechanism for finding 
directors liable differs between strict liability based on position but subject 
to defences and liability based on actual involvement or fault. 
III.  DIVERSITY IN DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY LAWS BETWEEN JURISDICTIONS 
This Part examines three areas in which there are marked differences 
in the law:  insolvent trading, protection of employee entitlements, and 
compensation of tort claimants.  These three areas involve laws for the 
protection of vulnerable corporate stakeholders.  Two observations can be 
made about laws in the jurisdictions surveyed:  the first is that they generally 
do not provide adequate protection of these stakeholder cohorts, and the 
second is that the inadequacy of this protection is exhibited in different ways 
across the jurisdictions.  This is in stark contrast to, for example, the 
protection of prospective investors, where the law is both stringent and 
noticeably similar across jurisdictions. 
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A. Diversity in Insolvent Trading Laws in Selected Jurisdictions 
Creditors such as banks are largely insulated from corporate failure by 
holding security over company assets.  However, the priority held by 
secured creditors significantly impacts upon the ability of unsecured 
creditors to recover when a company becomes insolvent.  Unsecured 
claimants must take their chances of receiving a small payment after the 
satisfaction of the claims of preferred creditors.163 
The risk of non-payment is one of the consequences of dealing with a 
limited liability entity and is generally known and understood by unsecured 
creditors.  Whether this risk can be adequately compensated ex ante is the 
subject of much law and economics literature.  Compensation mechanisms 
include the ability to diversify away the risk of loss by investing in multiple 
companies, and to charge a premium on the price of goods, services or credit 
supplied, sufficient to cover the risk of loss.  Because small trade creditors in 
many instances lack the ability to self-protect by these mechanisms, they are 
vulnerable to the risk of non-payment in the event of their debtor’s 
insolvency.  Their loss can have flow-on effects for their own employees and 
creditors. 
Understandably, there is no legislation that allows for the recovery 
from directors or shareholders of unpaid debts incurred whilst the company 
is solvent.  This undermines the concept of limited liability and the separate 
legal entity of the company.  However, one might expect that the 
vulnerability of unsecured creditors would justify widespread legislative 
intervention where the company incurred the debts when it was insolvent.  
This is not the case.  The survey of the jurisdictions outlined below shows 
that some have laws which are difficult to enforce and others have no 
legislation on this matter at all. 
In Australia,164 the Corporations Act 2001 imposes both personal 
liability, and in some cases, criminal penalties, on directors who allow their 
company to trade whilst insolvent.165  Section 588G(1) imposes liability on 
directors for the company’s debt, where: 
(a)  a person is a director of a company at the time when the 
company incurs a debt; and  
                                                 
163
  These typically include the costs of the liquidation and the payment of employees’ entitlements. 
164
  Wheelwright, supra note 6. 
165
  This is in addition to directors’ duties to the company under the Corporations Act, 2001,  
c. 2D, pt. 2D.1 (Austl.). 
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(b)  the company is insolvent at that time, or becomes 
insolvent by incurring that debt, or by incurring at that time 
debts including that debt; and  
(c)  at that time, there are reasonable grounds for suspecting 
that the company is insolvent, or would so become insolvent, as 
the case may be . . . 
. . . . 
(2)  By failing to prevent the company from incurring the 
debt, the person contravenes this section if:  
(a)  the person is aware at that time that there are such 
grounds for so suspecting; or  
(b)  a reasonable person in a like position in a company in the 
company's circumstances would be so aware.  
In addition to being civilly liable, the director commits a criminal offence if 
the director’s failure to prevent the company incurring the debt is 
dishonest.166  Courts have a range of options in relation to contraventions of 
§ 588G.  In addition to holding the directors liable for the debts of the 
company from the commencement of insolvent trading, they may impose on 
directors pecuniary penalties,167 banning orders,168 and compensation 
orders.169  Defences are available under § 588H. 
However, several aspects of the legislation have created problems.170  
The liquidation requirement means that directors can escape liability by 
placing the company into voluntary administration.  If the liquidator chooses 
not to take action to enforce the provision, creditors face a number of 
procedural hurdles before they themselves can sue.171 
                                                 
166
  Corporations Act, 2001, c. 5, pt. 5.7B, § 588G(3) (Austl.). 
167
  Corporations Act, 2001, c. 9, Pt. 9.4B, § 1317G (Austl.). 
168 
 Corporations Act, 2001, c. 2D, Pt. 2D.6, § 206B (Austl.) (banning orders disqualify a person from 
managing a corporation in specified circumstances). 
169
  Corporations Act, 2001, §§ 588J, 1317H (Austl.).  An order may be sought by the regulator, or by 
the company’s liquidator.  Note that the compensation is payable to the company and not to individual 
creditors. 
170
  An example is the definition of insolvency, and whether the commercial reality of a company 
being able to borrow more money affects its solvency.  See, e.g., Powell v. Fryer [2000] S.A.S.C. 97; 
Southern Cross Interiors Party Ltd. (In Liq) v. Deputy Comm’r of Taxation [2001] 165 F.L.R. 430; Lewis 
v. Doran [2004] 184 F.L.R. 454.  Cf. Emanuel Management Party Ltd. v. Fosters Brewing Group Ltd. 
[2003] 178 F.L.R. 1.  See also HELEN ANDERSON, CORPORATE DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY TO CREDITORS 148-
152 (Lawbook Co. 2006). 
171 
 Corporations Act, 2001, c. 5, Pt. 5.7B, §§ 588R-U (Austl.).  
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The United Kingdom172 does not have insolvent trading as such.  Its 
legislation affords a dual approach, targeting both fraudulent trading as well 
as wrongful trading.  The former is imposed by § 213 of the Insolvency 
Act,173 which provides that: 
(1) If in the course of the winding up of a company it appears 
that any business of the company has been carried on with 
intent to defraud creditors of the company or creditors of any 
other person, or for any fraudulent purpose, the following has 
effect. 
(2) The court, on the application of the liquidator may declare 
that any persons who were knowingly parties to the carrying on 
of the business in the manner above-mentioned are to be liable 
to make such contributions (if any) to the company's assets as 
the court thinks proper.  
Fraud for the purposes of § 213 has been defined as requiring “actual 
dishonesty involving, according to current notions of fair trading among 
commercial men at the present day, real moral blame.”174  In Re William C 
Leitch Brothers Ltd.,175 Maugham J. stipulated that this occurs “when there 
is to the knowledge of the directors no reasonable prospect of the creditors 
ever receiving payment of those debts.”176  This includes turning a blind eye, 
where there is a suspicion of the relevant facts together with a deliberate 
decision to avoid confirming their existence.177  Criminal liability also 
applies.178  The difficulties in making out the requirements of “actual 
dishonesty” and “real moral blame” led to the enactment of the wrongful 
trading provisions, following recommendations by the Jenkins Committee179 
and the Cork Committee.180 
Wrongful trading, which is governed by § 214 of the Insolvency Act 
1986, is considerably more involved than fraudulent trading.  There is the 
                                                 
172
  Lowry, supra note 75. 
173
  Insolvency Act, 1986, § 213 (U.K.). 
174
  In Re Patrick and Lyon Ltd., [1933] Ch. 786, 790. 
175
  In Re William C. Leitch Brothers, Ltd., [1932] 2 Ch. 71.  Cf. Re Augustus Barnett & Son Ltd., 
[1986] B.C.C. 98904. 
176
  Id. at 77.  See also Welham v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1961] A.C. 103; Bernasconi v. 
Nicholas Bennett & Co., [2000] B.C.C. 921; Aktieselskabet Dansk Skibsfinansiering v. Brother, [2000] 1 
H.K.L.R.D. 568; Regina v. Grantham, [1984] Q.B. 675. 
177
  Morris v. State Bank of India, [2005] 2 B.C.L.C. 328.   
178
  Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 993 (U.K.).  
179 
 BOARD OF TRADE, REPORT OF THE COMPANY LAW COMMITTEE, 1962, Cmnd. 1749, 195 (U.K.). 
180 
 BOARD OF TRADE, REPORT OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE INSOLVENCY LAW AND PRACTICE, 1981, 
Cmnd. 8558, c. 44 (U.K.) 
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same requirement that the company be wound up in insolvent liquidation, 
and a person who was a director at that time “is to be liable to make such 
contribution (if any) to the company's assets as the court thinks proper.”181  
Directors may not escape liability by being a “sleeping” director,182 or 
through ignorance, either of the facts of the company’s insolvency, or of the 
basic183 financial and accounting knowledge necessary to fulfill their 
obligations.184 
But unlike fraudulent trading, the wrongful trading section requires 
that the director “knew or ought to have concluded that there was no 
reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent 
liquidation,”185 unless the court is satisfied that the director “took every step 
with a view to minimising the potential loss to the company's creditors as 
(assuming him to have known that there was no reasonable prospect that the 
company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation) he ought to have 
taken.”186  The relevant standard is of a “reasonably diligent person having 
both—(a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably 
be expected of a person carrying out the same functions as are carried out by 
that director in relation to the company, and (b) the general knowledge, skill 
and experience that that director has.”187 
Malaysia,188 like the United Kingdom, imposes liability for both 
wrongful and fraudulent trading.  Breach of the wrongful trading provision, 
§ 303(3) of the Companies Act 1965, is both a civil wrong and a crime 
attracting serious fines and possible imprisonment.189  It states: 
If in the course of the winding up of a company or in any 
proceedings against a company it appears that an officer of the 
company who was knowingly a party to the contracting of a 
debt had, at the time the debt was contracted, no reasonable or 
probable ground of expectation, after taking into consideration 
the other liabilities, if any, of the company at the time, of the 
company being able to pay the debt, the officer shall be guilty 
of an offence against this Act.  
                                                 
181
  Insolvency Act, 1986, § 214 (U.K.). 
182 
 Re Brian D Pierson (Contractors) Ltd., [2001] 1 B.C.L.C. 275, 309. 
183
  Insolvency Act, 1986, § 214 (U.K.). 
184 
 Re DKG Contractors Ltd., [1990] B.C.C. 903, 912. 
185
  Insolvency Act, 1986, § 214(2)(b) (U.K.). 
186
  Id. § 214(3). 
187
  Id. § 214. 
188
  Pascoe, supra note 64. 
189
  Companies Act, § 303(3) (1965) (Malay.).  Breach attracts a penalty of imprisonment for one year 
or a fine of 5,000 Ringgit. 
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Section 304(2) provides for directors’ liability, stating that:  
Where a person has been convicted of an offence under 
subsection 303(3) in relation to the contracting of such a 
debt . . . the Court, on the application of the liquidator or any 
creditor or contributory of the company, may, if it thinks proper 
so to do, declare that the person shall be personally responsible 
without any limitation of liability for the payment of the whole 
or any part of that debt.  
Possible recovery under the section is limited.  The applicant needs to prove 
that the director knowingly participated in the incurrence of the debt and that 
the director had no reasonable or probable ground to expect that the 
company could pay it.190  In addition, by making criminal liability a 
prerequisite for civil liability, the criminal burden of proof is imposed onto 
the recovery by the liquidator or creditor.  There are also criminal sanctions 
for those who “knowingly” carry on the business of the company with the 
intent to defraud creditors.191  Here, civil recovery is not linked to a criminal 
conviction, but the requirement to prove an intent to defraud is a significant 
hurdle.192 
Like the United Kingdom, Hong Kong193 allows for directors’ liability 
for fraudulent trading, but it has not adopted the more recent wrongful 
trading provisions of its former colonial governors.  Section 275(1) of the 
Companies Ordinance194 provides that: 
If in the course of the winding up of a company it appears that 
any business of the company has been carried on with intent to 
defraud creditors of the company or creditors of any other 
person or for any fraudulent purpose, the court, on the 
application of the Official Receiver, or the liquidator or any 
creditor or contributory of the company, may, if it thinks proper 
so to do, declare that any persons who were knowingly parties 
to the carrying on of the business in manner aforesaid shall be 
personally responsible, without any limitation of liability, for all 
or any of the debts or other liabilities of the company as the 
court may direct. 
                                                 
190
  Id. 
191
  Id. §§ 304(1), 304(5). 
192
  There is one reported case:  H. Rosen Engineering B.V. v. Siow Yoon Keong [1997] 1 C.L.J. 137, 
1 A.M.R. 157 (Malay.). 
193
  Goo et al., supra note 54. 
194
  Companies Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 32, § 275(1) (H.K.), available at 
http://www.hklii.org/hk/legis/ord/32/s275.html. 
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The British definition of fraud applies in Hong Kong, so that directors are 
liable if there is proof that they knew or ought to have known that there was 
no reasonable prospect of the company avoiding insolvent liquidation.195  
This is a question of fact resolved by asking whether the director’s decision 
to continue to trade involved unnecessary risks to the repayment of 
creditors.196  Section 275(3) of the Companies Ordinance imposes criminal 
liability. 
New Zealand197 also has laws against fraudulent trading.198  Liability 
is provided for in § 380(2) of the Companies Act.199  Due to the purpose 
requirement in this section, it is not targeted at directors whose only 
motivation is to save the company, regardless of whether that aim was 
unrealistic.200  Section 135 deals with reckless trading,201 imposing a duty, 
objectively assessed, on directors to supervise the company’s business.202  
Section 136 imposes an overlapping duty, providing that:  “[a] director of a 
company must not agree to the company incurring an obligation unless the 
director believes at that time on reasonable grounds that the company will be 
able to perform the obligation when it is required to do so.” 
South Africa203 takes a different approach, by including both 
fraudulent and reckless trading in one section.  Section 424 of the 
Companies Act 1973 imposes personal liability on directors, by providing 
that:  
                                                 
195  
 In Re William C. Leitch Ltd., [1932] 2 Ch. 71, see also supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
196  
 See, e.g., Sec’y of State for Trade and Indus. v. Gash, [1997] 1 B.C.L.C. 341; Re Amaron Ltd., 
[1998] B.C.C. 264; Re Park House Properties Ltd., [1998] B.C.C. 847; Re McNulty’s Interchange Ltd. & 
Anor., [1988] 4 B.C.C. 533; Sec’y of State for Trade and Indus. v. Joiner Re Synthetic Tech. Ltd., [1993] 
B.C.C. 549. 
197
  Noonan & Watson, supra note 28. 
198
  Companies Act 1993, 1993 S.N.Z. No. 105, § 380(1) (N.Z.) makes it an offence for directors to 
carry on business with an intent to defraud creditors or any other person or for a fraudulent purpose.  In 
addition, § 33 of the Companies Amendment Act 2006, 2006 S.N.Z. No. 56 (N.Z.) makes it an offence for 
directors who, with intent to defraud a creditor or creditors, do anything that causes material loss to any 
creditor. 
199
  Companies Act 1993, 1993 S.N.Z. 105 § 380(2) (N.Z.):  “Every director of a company who,—(a) 
By false pretences or other fraud induces a person to give credit to the company; or (b) With intent to 
defraud creditors of the company,—(i) Gives, transfers, or causes a charge to be given on, property of the 
company to any person; or (ii) Causes property to be given or transferred to any person; or (iii) Caused or 
was a party to execution being levied against property of the company—commits an offence and is liable 
on conviction to the penalties set out in § 373(4) of this Act.” 
200
  See Re Nimbus Trawling Co. Ltd., [1986] 2 N.Z.L.R. (C.A.) (N.Z.); Keegan v. Page Vivian 
Motors Ltd., [1986] 2 N.Z.L.R. 308 (C.A.) (N.Z.). 
201
  “A director of a company must not—(a) Agree to the business of the company being carried on in 
a manner likely to create a substantial risk of serious loss to the company’s creditors; or (b) Cause or allow 
the business of the company to be carried on in a manner likely to create a substantial risk of serious loss to 
the company’s creditors.” 
202
  See Mason v. Lewis, [2006] 3 N.Z.L.R. 225 (C.A.) (N.Z.). 
203
  Van der Linde, supra note 46. 
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When it appears, . . . that any business of the company was or is 
being carried on recklessly or with intent to defraud creditors of 
the company or creditors of any other person or for any 
fraudulent purpose, the Court may, on the application of the 
Master, the liquidator, the judicial manager, any creditor or 
member or contributory of the company, declare that any person 
who was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the business in 
the manner aforesaid, shall be personally responsible, without 
any limitation of liability, for all or any of the debts or other 
liabilities of the company as the Court may direct.204 
Intent is a key issue.  In order to qualify as reckless the business must be 
carried on with a minimum of gross negligence, while the minimum 
requirement for fraudulent trading is intent in the form of dolus eventualis.205  
Trading whilst insolvent is not sufficient on its own to constitute 
recklessness or fraud; nonetheless, where a company continues to incur 
debts when a reasonable person in business would have realized that there 
was no reasonable prospect that the creditors would receive payment when 
due, courts will draw an inference of recklessness.206  The director can be 
held liable for “all or any” of the debts of the company,207 and there is no 
need to prove a causal connection between the reckless or fraudulent 
carrying on of the business and the debt or debts for which liability is sought 
to be imposed.208  Criminal liability may also be imposed.209 
In France,210 the Code de commerce contains arguably very harsh 
provisions on directors in the event of a company’s insolvency.  Article  
L 651-2 of the Code de commerce imposes liability for any director, 
                                                 
204
  Companies Act of 1973 s. 424 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.acts.co.za/company/index.htm. 
205 
 Dolus eventualis (indirect intention) exists when the possibility of a particular consequence or 
circumstance is foreseen, and there is a reckless disregard as to whether it ensues or not.  The person knows 
that the action—or the consequences of the action—are wrong.  See C. G. VAN DER MERWE & J. E. DU 
PLESSIS, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 304 (Kluwer Law Int’l. 2004). 
206 
 See Ozinsky NO v Lloyd and Others 1995 (2) SA 915 (A) (S. Afr.); Philotex (Pty) Ltd. v Snyman, 
Braitex (Pty) Ltd. v. Snyman 1998 (2) SA 138 (SCA) (S. Afr.); Terblanche NO v Damji 2003 (5) SA 489 
(C) (S. Afr.). 
207
  Companies Act of 1973 s. 424(1) (S. Afr.). 
208
  According to Saincic v Industro-Clean (Pty) Ltd. 2006 SCA 77JOL 17559 (SCA) (S. Afr.), the 
Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa “held in Philotex (Pty) Ltd. v. Snyman, Braitex (Pty) Ltd. v. 
Snyman, 1998 (2) SA 138 (SCA) at 142 H-I, that it is not necessary to prove a causal link between the 
relevant conduct and the debts or liabilities for which there is a declaration of personal liability in terms of 
s. 424.  But the absence of such a proven link is a factor to be taken into consideration by the court in the 
exercise of its discretion and in order to decide whether such a declaration is, in all the circumstances, just 
and equitable.”  Philotex was distinguished on the facts in Saincic. 
209
  Companies Act of 1973 s. 424(3) (S. Afr.).  
210
  See Mauro, supra note 81. 
JANUARY 2009 DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY 29 
 
amongst others, where the insolvency of the company is partly or entirely 
due to a director’s fault in management.  It provides: 
Where the rescission of a safeguard or of a reorganization plan 
or the liquidation of a legal entity reveals an excess of liabilities 
over assets, the court may, in instances where management fault 
has contributed to the excess of liabilities over assets, decide 
that the debts of the legal entity will be borne, in whole or in 
part, by all or some of the de jure or de facto managers, who 
have contributed to the management fault.  If there are several 
managers, the court may, by way of a reasoned ruling, declare 
them jointly and severally liable.  The right of action shall be 
barred after three years from the date of issuance of the order 
pronouncing the liquidation proceedings or the rescission of the 
plan.  Sums paid by the managers in compliance with the first 
paragraph shall form part of the debtor's assets.  These sums 
shall be distributed to all creditors on a pro rata basis.211 
In addition, Article L 653-2 of the Code de commerce allows the court to 
disqualify the director from holding that office in any other company for a 
maximum of fifteen years.212  Further criminal liability is found in Article L 
654-2 Code de commerce where the director commits certain crimes during 
the company’s bankruptcy.213  These include embezzlement, concealing the 
company’s property or increasing the insolvency of the company.  If these 
same acts take place before the insolvency starts, they constitute a misuse of 
company assets and the director is liable for breach of his fiduciary duties. 
214
 
In China,215 there is no insolvent trading liability as such.  However, 
there are a number of provisions relating to insolvency that act to protect 
creditors.  China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law,216 which came into effect on 
June 1, 2007, lifts the corporate veil, imposing liability on directors of 
insolvent companies where breaches of fiduciary duties cause the 
                                                 
211
  C.  COM. art. L 651-2. 
212
  C. COM. art. L 653-2, 11. 
213
  C. COM. art. L 654-2, 3.  The law establishes a maximum term of 5 years imprisonment and 75,000 
euro fine. 
214 
 C. COM art. L 242-6 § 3. 
215
  See Chenxia Shi & Hu Bin, supra note 38. 
216 
 The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (promulgated by Presidential Order No. 54, Aug. 27, 2006, 
effective June 1, 2007) (P.R.C.) replaced the State Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (Trial Implementation) 
(1986).  See generally Chau E. Jin & Clifford C. Shanhai, The Reform of PRC Corporate Bankruptcy Law: 
Slowly but Surely, 16(8) CHINA L. & PRAC. 19 (2002). 
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liquidation.217  Disqualification orders may also be sought against directors, 
and the company’s administrator can claw back assets which were diverted 
to avoid the reach of creditors.218  Similarly, the administrator may recover 
assets embezzled by directors and managers, and these directors may be 
ordered to pay compensation to creditors whose interests have been 
harmed.219  In addition, a range of criminal penalties apply.220 
As in China, there is no specific liability for insolvent trading in South 
Korea.221  Liability to a third party is only imposed on a director where loss 
is incurred as a result of the director’s neglect of his or her duties to the 
company, if such neglect results from wrongful intent or gross negligence.222  
This includes the behavior of directors during periods of financial difficulty, 
if such behavior interferes with the company’s ability to pay its debts.  
In summary, a superficial examination of the provisions outlined 
above might give the impression that there is extensive civil and criminal 
legislation governing insolvent trading.  However, the requirements of proof 
of knowledge and, in some cases, intent, the availability of defences, and a 
variety of procedural hurdles significantly affect the effectiveness of these 
forms of creditor protection.  It is interesting to note that both Canada and 
the United States lack federal statutory law governing insolvent trading.  
B.  Diversity in Employee Entitlements Laws in Selected Jurisdictions 
When companies collapse, employees can miss out on entitlements, 
including unpaid wages, holiday pay, redundancy payments, pay in lieu of 
long-service leave, and superannuation contributions.  Employees are even 
more vulnerable to corporate failure than unsecured creditors for two 
reasons.  First, they lack the ability to diversify the investment of their labor 
by holding multiple jobs, and second, they not only lose the amounts owed 
to them but also their wages from week to week. 
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 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (promulgated by Presidential Order No. 54, Aug. 27, 2006, effective 
June 1, 2007), art. 125, LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Oct. 14, 2008) (P.R.C.). 
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 Id. art. 36. 
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abusing his or her powers, causing bankruptcy or heavy losses to the company or enterprise which results 
in heavy losses of the state’ interests, he or she shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more 
than three years or criminal detention, or to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not 
more than seven years in very serious cases. 
221
  See Song, supra note 78. 
222 
 [Commercial Code, Act No. 5591] art. 401-2 § (1)-(2) (1998) (S. KOR.). 
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Because of this vulnerability, as well as the strength in some countries 
of the trade union movement, it might be expected that corporations statutes 
would provide comprehensive protection of employee entitlements.  
However, this is not the case. 
In Australia,223 employees, although unsecured creditors, enjoy a 
small measure of priority in distributions made by the liquidator when a 
company fails and is wound up in liquidation.224  However, this priority may 
not be sufficient to ensure their proper compensation.225  As a result of a 
public outcry in the wake of a series of prominent corporate failures, 
Australia introduced two measures for the protection of employees. 
The first is Part 5.8A of the Corporations Act,226 which enables the 
liquidator to recover compensation from a “person”227 who has entered into 
an agreement or transaction with the intention of preventing the recovery of 
entitlements of employees of a company, or of significantly reducing the 
amounts of entitlements that can be recovered.228  Criminal penalties also 
apply.229  While the provision may appear harsh, the requirement to prove 
subjective intent significantly diminishes its effectiveness.  There has not 
been a single successful claim under these provisions in the eight years since 
the legislation was introduced.  In addition, while employees themselves 
may take action against a director with respect to their loss, they require the 
liquidator’s permission and must wait six months or more after the company 
has commenced winding up.230 
The ineffectiveness of this legislation prompted a taxpayer-funded 
scheme called the General Employee Entitlements and Redundancy Scheme 
(“GEERS”), which pays a portion of the entitlements of employees that have 
been lost upon their employer’s liquidation.231  While this scheme is 
beneficial to employees, it arguably undermines the incentive for directors to 
                                                 
223
  See Wheelwright, supra note 6. 
224
  Corporations Act, 2001, No. 50, part 5.6, div. 6, sub. div. D § 556 (Austl.) (as amended).  In the 
United States, liquidation is known as bankruptcy. 
225
  Priority in winding up means that the liquidator ensures that creditors in designated categories 
under § 556 are paid their entitlements before lower ranked creditors are paid anything.  The existence of 
General Employee Entitlements and Redundancy Scheme (“GEERS”), discussed infra note 231 and 
accompanying text, provides evidence of the fact that in many cases, the employees of a company are 
insufficiently compensated by virtue of their priority when the company is wound up. 
226
  Corporations Act, 2001, Part 5.8A, § 596AA-AI (Austl.) (as amended) (This was inserted into the 
Corporations Act by the Corporations Law Amendment (Employee Entitlements) Act, 2000 (Austl.).) 
227
  Id. § 596AC.  This term is not defined for the purpose of this section, but includes a director. 
228  
 Id. § 596AB.  
229
  Id. part 9.4, div. 2 § 1311, Sched. 3.  These are a fine of up to $110,000 or imprisonment for 10 
years, or both. 
230 
 Id. part 5.8A, § 596AG. 
231
  See generally GEERS http://www.workplace.gov.au/workplace/Programmes/Employee 
Entitlements/GEERSV2/ (last visited May 6, 2008).  There are limits on what employees may recover. 
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make adequate provision for employee entitlements prior to the company’s 
insolvency. 
Canada,232 by way of contrast, has considerably more generous 
provisions than Australia.  Federal, provincial and territorial statutes specify 
that directors may be held personally liable for employee entitlements233 for 
a prescribed period.234  The provisions become relevant when the 
corporation fails to pay these entitlements, usually in the lead up to 
insolvency.235  Section 119(1) of the Canada Business Corporations Act 
1985 (“CBCA”) is an example: 
Directors of a corporation are jointly and severally, or 
solidarily, liable to employees of the corporation for all debts 
not exceeding six months wages payable to each such employee 
for services performed for the corporation while they are such 
directors respectively.236 
Pursuant to § 119(3), the director must be sued within two years after 
ceasing to be a director.237  A due diligence defence applies under the 
CBCA.238  Directors who pay employee entitlements under these provisions 
are then subrogated to the rights of the employees in terms of priority of 
recovery from the company’s liquidated assets.239  
Section 234(2) of the Employment Relations Act 2000 governs 
liability with respect to certain unpaid employee entitlements in New 
Zealand.  The section provides: 
                                                 
232
  See Sarra, supra note 17. 
233
  See Barrette v. Crabtree Estate, [1993] 1 S.C.R 1027 (Can.).  However, severance pay is not 
included.  It is considered to be a payment arising from breach of contract, and not from services rendered.  
However, where a collective agreement guarantees the payment of severance pay on dismissal based on a 
formula of service, it may be included in the claim against the directors.  See, e.g., Schwartz v. Scott, 
[1985] C.A. 713, 32 B.L.R. 1 (Can.). 
234 
 See, e.g., Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., c. C-44 (1985).  Related compensation can 
include vacation pay and guaranteed bonuses.  Mills-Hughes et al. v. Raynor et al., [1988] 63 O.R.2d 343, 
730(n) (Can.). 
235
  The Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-44 § 119(2) (1985) provides that:  “A 
director is not liable under subsection (1) unless (a) the corporation has been sued for the debt within six 
months after it has become due and execution has been returned unsatisfied in whole or in part; (b) the 
corporation has commenced liquidation and dissolution proceedings or has been dissolved and a claim for 
the debt has been proved within six months after the earlier of the date of commencement of the liquidation 
and dissolution proceedings and the date of dissolution; or (c) the corporation has made an assignment or a 
bankruptcy order has been made against it under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and a claim for the 
debt has been proved within six months after the date of the assignment or bankruptcy order.” 
236
  Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., c. C-44, § 119(1) (1985). 
237
  Id. § 119(3). 
238
  Id. § 123. 
239
  Id. § 119(5). 
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Where . . . the Labour Inspector establishes on the balance of 
probabilities that the amount claimed in the action by way of 
minimum wages or holiday pay240 or both is, if judgment is 
given for that amount, unlikely to be paid in full, whether 
because— 
(a) the company is in receivership or liquidation; or 
(b) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the 
company does not have sufficient assets to pay that amount in 
full,— 
the Authority may authorise the Labour Inspector to 
bring an action for the recovery of that amount against any 
officer, director, or agent of the company who has directed or 
authorised the default in payment of the minimum wages or 
holiday pay or both.241 
Liability is joint and several,242 and is initiated by Labour Inspector 
commencing proceedings in the Employment Relations Authority against the 
company for the payment of the relevant amounts.  The Employment 
Relations Authority then has discretion to authorise the Labour Inspector to 
bring the recovery action against the director. 
In South Africa, employers are required to withhold and pay over 
contributions on behalf of their employees, pursuant to the Unemployment 
Insurance Contributions Act 2002.  Directors are personally liable for any 
amount withheld and not paid over, in addition to penalties.243  There are no 
defences available.244 
In Hong Kong,245 directors are not liable for unpaid employee 
entitlements upon corporate insolvency.  Where employees are owed wages 
and other specified entitlements,246 the Protection of Wages on Insolvency 
Ordinance may make ex gratia payments to applicants.247  A fund established 
under § 6 of that Ordinance is made up of business registration fees248 and 
other specified monies.  Similarly, in the United Kingdom,249 the 
                                                 
240
  These are provided for under the Minimum Wages Act 1983, 1983 S.N.Z. No. 115 (N.Z.) or the 
Holidays Act 2003, 2003 S.N.Z No. 129 (N.Z.). 
241
  Employment Relations Act 2000, 2000 S.N.Z. No. 24, § 234(2) (N.Z.). 
242
  Id. § 234(3). 
243
  Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act of 2002 s. 7(4) (S. Afr.). 
244
  Id.  
245
  See Goo et al., supra note 54. 
246
  These are wages in lieu of notice and severance pay. 
247
  Protection of Wages on Insolvency Ordinance, (1985) Cap. 380, § 16.  (H.K.). 
248 
 These are paid under the Business Registration Ordinance, (1997) Cap 310, § 21. (H.K.). 
249
  See Lowry, supra note 75. 
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Employment Rights Act of 1996250 establishes the National Insurance Fund.  
This pays amounts of unpaid wages, accrued entitlements, payment in lieu of 
notice, and redundancy pay. 
In summary, there is little legislation to ensure the protection of 
employee entitlements across the jurisdictions surveyed, and what legislation 
there is, with the exception of Canada, is inadequate to ensure these 
vulnerable corporate stakeholders are compensated for their losses.  It is 
noteworthy that a number of jurisdictions, such as Australia, the United 
Kingdom, and Hong Kong, have introduced taxpayer-funded schemes to 
provide partial compensation to unpaid employees upon corporate 
insolvency. 
C.  Diversity in Tort Laws in Selected Jurisdictions   
Next, this article briefly examines tort law across jurisdictions.  It is 
presented as a contrast to the varied statutory provisions examined above.  
Interestingly, in the absence of individual national legislation, some of the 
Commonwealth countries discussed above have developed law which is an 
amalgam of the case law decided in these countries.  However, the weakness 
of this development is that there is general dissatisfaction with the state of 
the law, as well as confusion as to the appropriate test to apply in any given 
situation.  South Africa, by way of contrast, avoids all of the judicial 
gymnastics of the Commonwealth countries by imposing liability on 
directors regardless of the fact that their actions were undertaken in their 
capacities as directors. 
Like unsecured creditors and employees, tort creditors are vulnerable 
corporate stakeholders.  In the event of insolvency of the defendant 
company, tort claimants generally have no resort to a compensation fund251 
and may face ongoing personal injury expenses.  Arguably, those who suffer 
financial loss as a result of the tortious conduct of company officers, for 
example directors making negligent misrepresentations at the time of 
making contracts, should enjoy the same degree of protection as those 
investing in companies via a prospectus.  Yet the difference in the degree of 
legislative safeguards in these two areas could not be more stark.  Tort 
claimants in the jurisdictions discussed below must rely on common law to 
establish their claims against directors, who, in many instances, successfully 
                                                 
250
  Employment Rights Act, (1996) (U.K.). 
251
  New Zealand is an exception, with its Accident Compensation Corporation for personal injury 
victims.  See Accident Compensation Corporation, http://www.acc.co.nz/index.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 
2008). 
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shield themselves behind the separate legal entity of the company and the 
concept of limited liability. 
As shown below, directors’ ability to successfully avoid liability has in 
part been caused by a misunderstanding or misuse of fundamental legal 
doctrines.252  The concept of limited liability relates to the liability of 
shareholders, not directors.  Shareholders’ liability is limited, in the event of 
a winding up, to the amount unpaid, if any, on their shares.253  The concept is 
not relevant to the liability of directors or employees or anyone else who acts 
on behalf of a company.254 
If corporate servants or agents commit a tort whilst acting on behalf of 
the company, they are personally liable for their actions, and liability is also 
attributed to the company.  This doctrine of vicarious liability ensures that 
the plaintiff has a viable defendant.  In the event of the company’s 
insolvency, however, the responsibility to pay the tort victim remains solely 
with the tortfeasor.  Nonetheless, where that tortfeasor is a director, the 
argument is sometimes made that the person was acting as the “directing 
mind and will” of the company, so that personal liability should not attach.255  
This is known as the organic theory.  However, in Commonwealth countries, 
according to Stephen J. in the High Court of Australia in Smorgon v. 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd.,256 “it has been in areas in 
which the ends of justice have been thought to require the attribution of 
mental states that the organic theory has been employed and developed.”257  
In other words, the fact that the director acted as the company is relevant for 
attributing his or her mental intent to the company, for the purpose of 
establishing liability on the part of the company where a mental element is 
required.  It is not intended to relieve that director of personal liability.  
Confusion over the meaning of attribution has led to many of the difficulties 
in the cases outlined below. 
                                                 
252
  See generally, Helen Anderson, The Theory of the Corporation and Its Relevance to Directors’ 
Tortious Liability to Creditors, 16 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 73. 
253
  See, e.g., Corporations Act, 2001, § 516 (Austl.). 
254
  See, e.g., Susan Watson & Andrew Willekes, Economic Loss and Directors’ Negligence, J. BUS. 
L. 217, 218 (2001). 
255
  See G.H.L. Fridman, Personal Tort Liability of Company Directors, 5 CANTERBURY L. REV. 41, 
54 (1992).  Neyers cites as a common misconception of the function of the organic theory that “once 
liability is attributed to the separate legal person through the actions of its ‘vital organs,’ the constituent 
directors are somehow ‘washed clean’ of legal responsibility.”  Jason W. Neyers, Canadian Corporate 
Law, Veil Piercing and the Private Law Model Corporation, 50 U. TORONTO L. J. 173, 228 (2000).  See 
also Ross Grantham, Commentary on Goddard, in CORPORATE PERSONALITY IN THE 20TH CENTURY 65, 
68-69 (Ross Grantham & Charles Rickett eds. 1998). 
256
  Smorgon v. Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. (1976) 134 C.L.R. 475, 483 (Austl.). 
257
  This follows Lord Hoffman’s judgment in the United Kingdom in Meridian Global Funds 
Management Asia Ltd. v. the Securities Commission, (1995) 2 A.C. 500, 505 (U.K.). 
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Within the Commonwealth countries, there are four different tests 
courts use to determine the personal liability of directors in tort.  Australia 
has relatively few cases on point, and these draw heavily on precedents from 
other Commonwealth jurisdictions.  The “direct or procure” test is the most 
common, and has been used in Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia 
since the development of liability of directors for company torts.  It is also 
the test most favorable to plaintiffs, and has been used for the torts of 
negligence, breach of copyright, nuisance, deceit, and conversion.  The 
“make the tort his own” test was first applied in 1978 and has been used in 
Canada, Britain, and Australia, principally in copyright, passing off, and 
patent cases, and is more difficult to make out.  The “assumption of 
responsibility” test, which was first applied in 1992, has been used in Britain 
and New Zealand, mainly in negligent misstatement cases.  Commentators 
discussing the law relating to a director’s personal liability to creditors in 
tort generally confine themselves to these three tests.258  However, a number 
of recent cases rely on a fourth rule originating from the decision in Said v. 
Butt,259 to find that directors are not liable for the tort of procuring a breach 
of contract that they commit while acting for the company.  
Commonwealth courts have been troubled by the dual roles of 
directors—as people and as the directing mind and will of companies.  Le 
Dain J. summed up the dilemma facing courts thus: 
On the one hand, there is the principle that an incorporated 
company is separate and distinct in law from its shareholders, 
directors and officers, and it is in the interests of the 
commercial purposes served by the incorporated enterprise that 
they should as a general rule enjoy the benefit of the limited 
liability afforded by incorporation.  On the other hand, there is 
the principle that everyone should answer for his tortious 
acts.260 
Each of the tests will now be briefly examined.  The first is the “direct or 
procure” test.  It originally sought to attribute liability to a director for the 
tortious actions of a more junior person in the company, where those actions 
                                                 
258
  See, e.g., John H. Farrar, The Personal Liability of Directors for Corporate Torts, 9 BOND L. REV. 
102 (1997), available at http://epublications.bond.edu.au/blr/vol9/iss1/6/; Francis Reynolds, Personal 
Liability of Company Directors in Tort, 33 HONG KONG L.J. 51 (2003); Andrew Borrowdale, Directors’ 
Liability in Tort, N. Z. L.J. 51(1999); Susan Watson & Andrew Willekes, Economic Loss and Directors’ 
Negligence, J. BUS. L. 217 (2001). 
259
  Said v. Butt, [1920] 3 K.B. 497 (U.K.). 
260 
 Mentmore Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. National Merchandising Manufacturing Company Inc., 
[1978] 89 D.L.R. (3d) 195, 203 (Can.). 
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are directed or procured by the director.261  Later courts, however, have 
frequently used the expression “direct or procure” to hold a director liable 
for his own actions.262 
The “make the tort his own” test originated in Canada in Mentmore 
Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. National Merchandising Manufacturing Company 
Inc.263  Le Dain J. of the Federal Court of Appeal of Canada found that cases 
warranting personal liability exhibited “a knowing, deliberate, wilful quality 
to the participation,” “that degree and kind of personal involvement by 
which the director or officer makes the tortious act his own.”264 
The third test, of “assumption of responsibility,” was outlined in the 
New Zealand decision in Trevor Ivory Ltd. and Trevor Ivory v. Anderson,265 a 
case of negligent misstatement involving a one-man company.  Hardie Boys 
J. said: 
Essentially, I think the test is, or at least includes, whether there 
has been an assumption of responsibility, actual or imputed.  
That is an appropriate test for the personal liability of both a 
director and an employee . . . .  Assumption of responsibility 
may well arise or be imputed where the director or employee 
exercises particular control or control over a particular 
operation or activity, . . .  This is perhaps more likely to arise 
within a large company where there are clear allocations of 
responsibility, than in a small one.266 
His Honour then commented that the use of a company to carry on the 
business could be seen as a personal disclaimer, rather than the basis for 
                                                 
261
  It is well accepted that employees are liable in tort for their actions as part of their employment.  
Given that they are more likely to be acting under others’ instructions, it seems ironic that this liability is 
unchallenged, yet the liability of those who give the instructions is contentious.  Even employees 
performing the “very essence” of their contract can be held personally liable in tort, according to the 
Supreme Court of Canada in London Drugs Ltd. v Kuehne & Nagel Int’l Ltd., [1992] 3 S.C.R. 299, (Can.). 
Iacobucci J. there stated:  “There is no general rule in Canada to the effect that an employee acting in the 
course of his or her employment and performing the ‘very essence’ of his or her contractual obligations 
with a customer does not owe a duty of care, whether one labels it ‘independent’ or otherwise, to the 
employer’s customer.”  Id. at 407-08. 
262 
 In Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp. (No 2), [2002] UKHL 43, [2003] 
1 A.C. 959, Lord Rodger described the use of the “direct or procure” test to ascribe liability for director’s 
own actions as “strangely complex.” 
263
  Mentmore Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. National Merchandising Manufacturing Company Inc., 
[1978] 89 D.L.R. (3d) 195 (Can.). 
264 
 Id. at 204. 
265 
 Trevor Ivory Ltd. and Trevor Ivory v. Anderson, [1992] 2 N.Z.L.R. 517 (N.Z.).  This decision 
built on the earlier decision in Fairline Shipping Corp. v. Adamson, [1975] Q.B. 180 (N.Z.).  See generally 
John H. Farrar, The Personal Liability of Directors for Corporate Torts, 9 BOND L. REV. 102, 109 (1997). 
266 
 Trevor Ivory Ltd. and Trevor Ivory v. Anderson, [1992] 2 N.Z.L.R. 517, 527 (N.Z.). 
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imputing an assumption of responsibility.267  In other words, why else would 
someone incorporate himself, as in Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd.,268 if not 
to escape from personal responsibility and liability?269 
The fourth rule arose from Said v. Butt,270 in which plaintiff brought 
action against the managing director of a theatre company for wrongfully 
and maliciously procuring the company to breach its contract with the 
plaintiff, by refusing him entry after he had purchased a ticket to enter the 
theatre.  Rather than providing a test of general application, the case simply 
stands for the proposition that directors cannot be liable for the tort of 
procuring a breach of contract which they commit while acting for the 
company. 
In Australia, courts have been unable to decide which test to apply.271  
Root Quality Pty Ltd. v. Root Control Technologies Pty. Ltd. examined and 
criticized each test.272  The tests were also canvassed extensively in 2003 in 
Johnson Matthey (Aust) Pty Ltd. v. Dascorp Pty. Ltd..273  Root Quality 
concluded that the director must be shown to have directed or procured the 
tortious conduct of the company.274  In King v. Milpurrurru, the court laid 
down a stricter test requiring that the defendant make the tort his own by 
deliberately and knowingly pursuing the course of conduct that constituted 
the breach.275 
Courts differ as to the extent of each test’s application, and as to its 
relevant factors.  Even though under the “direct or procure” test, Australian 
courts generally agree that the holding of an office, such as director or even 
managing director, does not itself render the office holder liable for the torts 
                                                 
267
  Id. at 528. 
268
  Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd., [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.) (U.K.). 
269 
 In Oakley Inc. v. Oslu Imports and Exports Pty. Ltd., [2000] F.C.A. 700, 35, Finn J. said, citing 
Mentmore, Trevor Ivory and Williams, that “such are both the controversies surrounding it in the common 
law world and its implications for small companies . . . . that, in the absence of argument directed to the 
foundation of the tort—and in particular to whether it properly is to be regarded in the present setting as an 
intentional tort—I am not prepared to assume liability from the fact that, as the company's alter ego, Mr. 
Tao directed the actions that gave rise to the infringements.” 
270 
 Said v. Butt, [1920] 3 K.B. 497 (U.K.). 
271 
 In G. M. (North Melbourne) v. Young Kelly (1986) 7 I.P.R. 149, 158 directors’ liability for their 
tortious actions on behalf of their companies was described as a complex and burgeoning field of  the law.  
In Root Quality v. Root Control Technologies Pty. Ltd. (2000) 177 A.L.R. 231, 115 (Austl.), Finklestein J. 
called it a “confusing picture on an issue that has persistently vexed the common law”.  See generally 
Helen Anderson, The Theory of the Corporation and Its Relevance to Directors’ Tortious Liability to 
Creditors, 16 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 73; Helen Anderson, Directors' Personal Liability to Creditors: Theory 
versus Tradition, 8 DEAKIN L. REV. 209 (2003). 
272 
 Root Quality v. Root Control Technologies Pty. Ltd. (2000) 177 A.L.R. 231 (Austl.). 
273
  Johnson Matthey (Aust.) Pty Ltd. v. Dascorp Pty Ltd. (2003) V.S.C. 291 (Austl.). 
274
  Root Quality v. Root Control Technologies Pty. Ltd. (2000) 177 A.L.R. 231 (Austl.); Microsoft 
Corp. v. Auschina Polaris Pty. Ltd. (1996) 142 A.L.R. 111 (Austl.). 
275
  King v Milpurrurru (1996) 34 I.P.R. 11 (Austl.). 
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of the company, the actual degree of involvement required is unresolved.  
Personal liability is not dependent on the director knowing that the conduct 
is in fact tortious, but there is no agreement as to the extent of involvement 
required of the director.  In Autocaps (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pro-Kit Pty Ltd.,276 
the director was liable as the person “in charge of its affairs” and with 
knowledge of the offending behaviour.  Martin Engineering Co v. Nicaro 
Holdings Pty. Ltd.277 described the director as the “moving spirit.”278  In 
Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd. v. Jain,279 a director was 
liable for “countenancing” the breach.  As such, the law in Australia remains 
unsettled, and it is difficult to predict which test will be applied in a given 
fact situation. 
Canada280 is similar to Australia in relation to the imposition of 
personal liability on directors, in that judicial opinion on the matter diverges.  
The Federal Court of Appeal in Mentmore, supra, noted that formulating a 
test of general application is a difficult task, and that courts will have 
“regard to the particular circumstances of each case to determine whether as 
a matter of public policy they call for personal liability.”281  
While Mentmore laid down the “make the tort his own” test,282 the 
Court of Appeal of Ontario applied the Said v. Butt rule 283 in ADGA Systems 
International Ltd. v. Valcom Ltd.284 Carthy J.A. found that the rule: 
provides an exception to the general rule that persons are 
responsible for their own conduct. . . .  The exception also 
assures that officers and directors, in the process of carrying on 
business, are capable of directing that a contract of employment 
be terminated or that a business contract not be performed on 
the assumed basis that the company’s best interest is to pay 
damages for failure to perform.  By carving out the exception 
for these policy reasons, the court has emphasized and left 
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 Autocaps (Aust) Pty Ltd v Pro-Kit Pty Ltd. (1999) 46 I.P.R. 339 (Austl.). 
277
  Martin Engineering Co v. Nicaro Holdings Pty Ltd. (1999) 100 A.L.R. 358 (Austl.). 
278
  “Moving spirit” is the expression also used by Sundberg J. in Pioneer Electronics Australia Pty 
Ltd. v. Lee (2000) 108 F.C.R. 216, 46 (Austl.), in finding a director liable for the torts of breach of 
copyright and passing off.  His Honour looked at the various tests of liability, commenting that “[t]he law 
on the personal liability of a director for corporate torts is in an uncertain state.  There seem to be at least 
four views having judicial support.”  Id. at 45.  He noted that the director “directed and promoted” the 
breaches.  Id. at 46 (emphasis added). 
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 Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd v. Jain (1990) 26 F.C.R. 53 (Austl.). 
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  See Sarra, supra note 17. 
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 Mentmore Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. National Merchandising Manufacturing Company Inc., 
[1978] 89 D.L.R. (3d) 195, 203 (Can.). 
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  Id. at 204. 
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 Said v. Butt, [1920] 3 K.B. 497 (U.K.). 
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 ADGA Systems Int’l. Ltd v. Valcom Ltd., [1999] 168 (4th) D.L.R. 351 (O.A.C.) (Can.) (Ont.). 
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intact the general liability of any individual for personal 
conduct.285 
The court found that this exception applies where the directors are procuring 
a breach of a contract to which their own company is a party.  Carthy J.A. 
found on the facts that the directors of a company which intentionally 
procured the breach of contract of employees of another company, in a 
recruitment exercise, were personally liable for the tort.286  In addition, 
despite the Said v. Butt287 exception, Carthy J.A. stressed the consistent line 
of Canadian authority which holds that “in all events, officers, directors and 
employees of corporations are responsible for their tortious conduct even 
though that conduct was directed in a bona fide manner to the best interests 
of the company.”288 
In New Zealand,289 the assumption of responsibility rule from Trevor 
Ivory290 is now being applied beyond negligent misstatement cases to “leaky 
building” cases.291  The test has been used as an obstacle to property damage 
claims against directors, although it was distinguished in Dicks v. Hobson 
Swan Construction Ltd. (In Liq.),292 on the basis of the director’s actual 
involvement in the project.293  
In the United Kingdom,294 a similar debate on the personal liability of 
a director qua director in tort has arisen.  The House of Lords,295 in Williams 
v. Natural Life Health Food Ltd. and Mistlin,296 upheld the “assumption of 
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  Id. at 357. 
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  Id.  Similar facts led to the same result in Multinail Australia Pty Ltd v. Pryde (Austl.) Pty Ltd., 
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procured a breach of their own company’s contract, finding that the “direct or procure” test was applicable 
otherwise.  Id. at 126. 
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 Said v. Butt, [1920] 3 K.B. 497 (U.K.). 
288
  ADGA Systems Int’l. Ltd v. Valcom Ltd., [1999] 168 (4th) D.L.R. 351 (O.A.C.) (Can.) (Ont.). 
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  See Noonan & Watson, supra note 28. 
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  Trevor Ivory Ltd. and Trevor Ivory v. Anderson, [1992] 2 N.Z.L.R. 517 (N.Z.). 
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  Id.  See also Sammuel D. Carpenter, Directors’ Liability and Leaky Buildings, N. Z. L.J. 117 (Apr. 
2006); N. Campbell, Leaking Homes, Leaking Companies, [2002] C.S.L.B. 101. 
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  Dicks v. Hobson Swan Construction Ltd (In Liq.), [2006] 7 N.Z.C.P.R. 881 (H.C.) (N.Z.) (Auck.) 
(Baragwanath J). 
293
  In the last 15 years in New Zealand, there has been increasing amounts of litigation to recover 
damages for newly built homes that subsequently suffer water damage.  Action has been taken against 
builders and developers to recover damages for economic loss, including remedial works, building 
consultants’ fees, accommodation costs, travelling costs and other consequential costs of the remedial 
works.  In a series of cases, New Zealand courts have looked at whether the directors of building 
companies have assumed personal responsibility for the building projects. 
294
  See Lowry, supra note 75. 
295 
 Lord Steyn, with Lord Goff, Lord Hoffman, Lord Clyde and Lord Hutton concurring. 
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 Williams et al. v. Natural Life Health Foods Ltd. et al., [1980] 1 WKLY. L. REP. 830 (U.K.).  See 
also Ross Grantham & Charles Rickett, Directors’ ‘Tortious’ Liability: Contract, Tort or Company Law?, 
62 MODERN L. REV. 133 (1999); Andrew Borrowdale, Directors’ Liability in Tort, N. Z. L. J. 51 (1999). 
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responsibility” test in a case of negligent misstatement.  Lord Steyn 
acknowledged the potential for director liability by noting that “whether the 
principal is a company or a natural legal person, someone acting on his 
behalf may incur personal liability in tort as well as imposing vicarious or 
attributed liability upon his principal.”297  Lord Steyn held that neither the 
defendant’s state of mind nor his internal arrangements with his company 
were relevant to the inquiry.  Instead, of relevance was “whether the director, 
or anybody on his behalf, conveyed directly or indirectly to the prospective 
franchisees that the director assumed personal responsibility towards”298 
them. 
Approving Trevor Ivory,299 Lord Steyn found that where a director 
acts in the capacity of director, he will not be liable.  His Lordship 
considered that the finding of a Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & 
Partners Ltd.300 “special relationship”301 between plaintiff and company is 
not the same as one between plaintiff and director.  The key issue was 
whether the director had acted in a way that exceeded his corporate authority 
as a director, so that any accountability for the tortious act became his alone.  
He stated: 
in order to establish personal liability under the principle of 
Hedley Byrne, which requires the existence of a special 
relationship between plaintiff and tortfeasor, it is not sufficient 
that there should have been a special relationship with the 
principal.  There must have been an assumption of 
responsibility such as to create a special relationship with the 
director or employee himself.302 
Dealing with criticisms of the assumption of responsibility test, Lord Steyn 
said: 
Returning to the particular question before the House it is 
important to make clear that a director of a contracting 
company may only be held liable where it is established by 
evidence that he assumed personal liability and that there was 
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 Williams et al. v. Natural Life Health Foods Ltd. et al., [1980] 1 WKLY. L. REP. 830, 835 (U.K.). 
298
  Id. 
299 
 Trevor Ivory Ltd. and Trevor Ivory v. Anderson, [1992] 2 N.Z.L.R. 517 (N.Z.). 
300 
 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465. (H.L. 1963). 
301
  Id.  In Hedley Byrne, the court found that the relationship between the parties was "sufficiently 
proximate" as to create a duty of care.  This was based on the court’s finding that it was reasonable for the 
defendants to have known that the information that they had given would be likely to have been relied upon 
in forming a contract.  The court stated that this would give rise to a "special relationship," where the 
defendant would be required to take sufficient care in giving advice to avoid liability in negligence. 
302
  Williams et al. v. Natural Life Health Foods Ltd. et al., [1980] 1 WKLY. L. REP. 830, 835 (U.K.). 
42 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL            VOL. 18 NO. 1 
 
the necessary reliance.  There is nothing fictional about this 
species of liability in tort.303 
The law, however, is not settled.  In the Standard Chartered Bank case, Lord 
Hoffmann rejected the earlier appellate view,304 stating that “[n]o one can 
escape liability for fraud by saying ‘I wish to make it clear that I am 
committing this fraud on behalf of someone else and I am not to be 
personally liable.’”305 
In Malaysia, it is rare to find cases holding directors personally liable 
for the tortious actions of their companies.  One such decision is Victor 
Cham v. Loh Bee Tuan.306  In that case, the Court found a director personally 
liable for deceit in relation to fraudulent misrepresentations contained in a 
sale and purchase document prepared by his company.  The Court applied 
English authorities307 in determining that the director had authorised or 
procured the company to commit the fraudulent misrepresentation.308 
South Africa contrasts starkly with the jurisdictions discussed above.  
The law of delict, as tort law is known in South Africa, has no difficulty 
attributing personal liability to directors, even if directors are simply 
carrying out their duties on behalf of the company.  The issue of whether the 
directors directed or procured the wrongful act of the company therefore 
does not arise in South African company law.309 
South Korea adopts a different method to find directors liable for their 
actions.  The Korean Commercial Code provides that: 
(1) If directors have acted in contravention of any law or 
regulation, or of the articles of incorporation or has neglected to 
perform their duties, they [such director] shall be jointly and 
                                                 
303
  Id. at 830, 837. 
304
  Standard Chartered Bank v. Pakistan National Shipping Corp., [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 218, 233 
(U.K.) (Aldous LJ). 
305
  See Standard Chartered Bank v. Pakistan National Shipping Corp and others, 1 BUTTERWORTHS 
COMPANY LAW CASES 252, 244-259 (D.D. Prentice ed., 2003). 
306
  Victor Cham v. Loh Bee Tuan [2006] 5 M.L.J. 359, [13] (Malay.). 
307
  See Rainham Chemical Works Ltd. v. Belvedere Fish Guano Co Ltd,. [1921] All E.R. 48 (U.K.); 
Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Ciryl Theatrical Syndicate Ltd., [1924] 1 K.B. 1 (U.K.). 
308
  See also Loh Bee Tuan v. Shing Yin Construction (Kota Kinabalu) Sdn Bhd [2002] 2 M.L.J. 532, 
[540] (Malay.).  In Victor Cham v. Loh Bee Tuan [2006] 5 M.L.J. 359, [366] (Malay.), the court referred to 
and approved of the decision of the Privy Council in Wah Tat Bank Ltd. v. Chan Cheng Kum [1975] 2 All 
E.R. 257 (S. Ct.) (Malay.).  In that case, Lord Salmon, id. at 272, applied the “direct or procure” test in 
imposing personal liability on the director. 
309 
 See M. Havenga, Directors’ Co-liability for Delicts, 18 S. AFR. MERCANTILE L. J. 229 (2006). 
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severally liable for damages to the company [emphasis added] 
[resulting from such acts or omissions].310 
Directors are also liable when the act in question is done in accordance with 
a resolution of the board, and they have either assented to the resolution, or 
failed to enter their dissenting opinion into the company minutes.  While the 
director is liable to the company and not to any outside party, a party 
affected by the directors’ negligence or other fault sues the company, and 
then the company recoups this amount from the director.311 
In summary, the law protecting tort claimants is diverse and 
unsatisfactory in many jurisdictions.  The lack of legislative protection of 
this group of most vulnerable corporate stakeholders is remarkable.  One 
could cynically conclude that legislatures are not in fact interested in 
deterrence and compensation of those adversely affected by corporate 
misbehavior, unless their contact with the company is voluntary and there 
are potentially large numbers of people involved.  Investors might be 
dissuaded from providing capital to companies without adequate safeguards.  
Because this would have adverse economic effects, there is an incentive to 
enact stringent provisions to encourage investor confidence.  The foregoing 
discussion shows that jurisdictions around the world have come to the same 
conclusion. 
Tort claimants, on the other hand, are involuntary, likely to be few in 
number, and have no economic value to add to the corporation.  Yet it is 
noteworthy that even contract creditors who have voluntarily entered into 
dealings with companies have not received more favourable treatment from 
the courts; indeed, in some cases, their consent to deal with a limited liability 
entity has been counted as a factor against a finding of liability on the part of 
the tortfeasor director.312  Contrast this with the position of an investor in a 
limited liability corporation, armed with an entire prospectus before deciding 
to invest. 
D.  Conclusion on Diversity of Laws in Selected Jurisdictions 
This Part has looked at three areas of law where there is considerable 
dissimilarity among jurisdictions.  Insolvent trading, which acts to protect 
unsecured trade creditors, has wide international variations.  Many countries 
                                                 
310
  Commercial Code, 2 CURRENT LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 641 (Korea Legislation 
Research Institute 1962) (emphasis added). 
311
  Id. § 399 (1). 
312
  See also H. Anderson, The Theory of the Corporation and Its Relevance to Directors’ Tortious 
Liability to Creditors, 16 AUSTRALIAN J. CORP. L. 73 (2004). 
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require fault, sometimes in terms of fraud, negligence, recklessness, or 
breach of duty.  The format of the various pieces of legislation differs as 
well.  Even in Australia under an apparently stringent legislative regime, 
parties face difficulties in terms of recovery.  Canada, unlike other 
Commonwealth countries, has no insolvent trading laws at all. 
Employee entitlements receive very limited legislative protection in 
the countries examined.  Canada’s regime, the most generous, imposes strict 
liability, subject to a due diligence defence.  As noted in Part C, supra, the 
subjective element in Australia’s test renders it useless, necessitating a 
government assistance scheme funded by taxpayers.  New Zealand’s scheme 
relies on the initiative of a government official, and is limited in the amounts 
recoverable.  The other countries looked at above have no laws imposing 
liability on directors. 
The rights of tort claimants were examined in some of the 
Commonwealth countries.  There is no relevant legislation, and courts have 
struggled to enunciate tests of general application.  In part this is because of 
a misunderstanding of the laws of attribution.  The director is seen as the 
directing mind and will of the company, and therefore his actions become 
the actions of the company itself, rather than his own.  Something special 
needs to be done to make the director personally liable for the tort, such as 
“making the tort his own” or an assumption of personal responsibility.  
There is no question that company employees committing torts are 
personally liable for their actions, in addition to the company being 
vicariously liable.  Directors’ liability for their own tortious conduct is 
recognized in jurisdictions such as South Africa and South Korea.  There is 
nothing in the doctrine of limited liability or separate legal entity that 
prevents a director’s actions from being attributed to the company for the 
purpose of making the company vicariously liable, as well as being a basis 
for personal liability.  Indeed, this point is made abundantly clear in the 
examination of the legislation in Part II and in this Part.  Recovery for tort 
claimants has been left to the vagaries of the common law, and the most 
significant problem for them is the lack of legislative will to entrench their 
rights of recovery.  A possible reason for this will be discussed in the next 
Part. 
IV.  REASONS FOR SIMILARITY AND DIVERSITY 
The preceding examination of the similarity and diversity of laws 
across various jurisdictions inevitably leads to the question of why this 
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should be so.  Indeed, it is equally valid to question why they should be 
similar, as it is to exclaim their differences. 
Nonetheless, it seems appropriate, after an extensive examination of 
these laws and jurisdictions, to speculate on why these laws are the way they 
are.  What follows is a brief review of the literature on similarities and 
differences in laws, to suggest some possible reasons why the laws surveyed 
in Parts II and III above should be as they are.  It does not attempt to draw 
any definitive conclusions. 
 It should be noted much of the comparative corporate law literature 
on convergence and divergence concentrates on the broader governance 
debate, rather than the narrower focus on directors’ liability for their 
companies’ faults and defaults.  Still, the same forces appear to be applicable 
to the present enquiry.  Broadly speaking, these can be summarized as 
political, economic, practical, and evolutionary (or path dependent). 
Political influences both for and against similarity are numerous.  
They include pressure from interest groups and institutions,313 such as 
business associations, trade unions, employer groups, consumer 
organizations, and local and international environmental lobbies.314  While 
pressure may be to reform the law to acknowledge the needs of a group’s 
particular constituents, often vested interests can actively work to protect 
themselves against legislative reform.315  Responses to corporate scandals 
can result in knee-jerk legislative reform tailored to the particular 
situation,316 as can a major environmental disaster.317  The political 
persuasion of the incumbent government will also affect its stance on 
corporate law reform,318 as will the extent to which law is made by the 
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  H. Hansmann & R. Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439, 453 
(2000). 
314
  These include the United Nations Environment Programme, Greenpeace, and the World Wild 
Fund for Nature, amongst many hundreds of others. 
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  Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 313, at 459-460 (discussing the arguments made in Lucien 
Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependance in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. 
L. REV. 127 (1999)). 
316
  J. Hill, The Persistent Debate about Convergence in Comparative Corporate Governance, 27 
SYDNEY L. REV. 743, 750 (2005).  “[P]ost-Enron regulatory developments are a potent reminder that 
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in the United States of the Sarbanes Oxley legislation, and in Australia, of CLERP 9.  “The architecture of 
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Responses to Global Corporate Scandals, 3 WIS. INT’L L. J. 367 (2005). 
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  For example, the CERCLA laws in the United States, discussed supra Part II.C and note 155, 
which were enacted in response to the environmental damage caused at Love Canal. 
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  This can include calls to reduce the compliance burden on business, which can result in less 
legislative intervention in corporate business. 
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courts, as opposed to the legislature.319  Some countries have more 
sophisticated theoretical frameworks and existing mechanisms, such as Law 
Reform Commissions and dedicated parliamentary committees, for the 
process of law reform than others.320 
Other relevant political factors include whether the country is run by a 
democratically elected government or not,321 levels of judicial and legislative 
accountability, and the overall transparency of the political process.  This is 
not to say, however, that similar forms of government necessarily lead to 
identical or similar law.  This has been borne out by the comparison of the 
laws of Australia, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom, 
where significant differences were noted.  The law as it is applied can also 
differ from the “law on the books,” due to lack of political will to enforce 
it.322  This is sometimes the result in a country into which law has been 
transplanted, perhaps by former colonial governors.323 
There can also be implicit or explicit political pressures from outside 
the country to adopt certain laws, for example, in order to be accepted into a 
trade group or other alliance.  The European Union is a good example of this 
phenomenon.324  Membership is in some instances contingent on adoption of 
harmonized laws, even though these are not always successful in the absence 
of supporting institutions and culture.325 
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  Katharina Pistor notes that “[l]egal systems that have facilitated this process of adaptation and 
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COMPANY AND COM. L. REV. 262 (2004); Paul J. Omar, Four Models for Rescue: Convergence or 
Divergence in European Insolvency Laws? Part I, INT’L COMPANY AND COM. L. REV. 127 (2007); Paul J. 
Omar, Four Models for Rescue: Convergence or Divergence in European Insolvency Laws? Part 2, INT’L 
COMPANY AND COM. L. REV. 171 (2007); M. Cristina di Luigi, An Invasive Top-Down Harmonisation or a 
Respectful Framework Model of National Laws? A Critique of the Societas Europaea Model, INT’L 
COMPANY AND COM. L. REV. 58 (2008). 
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  Hill gives the example of the transplantation of corporate governance laws to Russia in the 1990’s 
commenting upon the “conundrum of corporate governance—the fact that the transplantation of 
demonstrably good laws may be totally ineffective.”  Hill, Persistent Debate, supra note 316, at 750. 
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A multitude of economic influences also drive similarity of laws.  
Access to the international market for capital can be a major motivating 
force for harmonization of laws, and the capital raising laws across the 
various jurisdictions outlined above provide evidence of this.  A “Force of 
Example”326 argument also exists, whereby jurisdictions adopt the laws of 
successful economies, in an attempt to match their economic achievements.  
For example, Hansmann and Kraakman claim that the predominance of the 
shareholder primacy model will inevitably lead to widespread convergence 
of the institutions of corporate governance.327 
The prevalence of multinational corporations and their desire to 
operate in acceptable regulatory environments is also a factor, as is the need 
for cross listing on foreign stock exchanges.  The pervasiveness of 
international legal, accounting and consulting firms, as well as investment 
banks, can also lead to a demand for more homogeneity in corporate law.328  
Not all economic influences, of course, lead to convergence of laws.  It can 
in fact be more economically efficient to have different laws, to take 
advantage of local conditions.329  Some multinationals might deliberately 
seek to locate some of their operations in countries with more liberal laws 
than their original countries of incorporation, precisely to avoid certain 
stringent requirements, for example in relation to labor laws or emissions 
controls. 
Practical considerations can mitigate against following the examples 
of legislative reform set by other countries.  Inertia is a powerful force, 
because law reform of any kind, including convergence with other 
jurisdictions, generally requires legislative action, often following extensive 
and costly government consultation processes.  The availability of 
alternative means of protecting a certain cohort of corporate stakeholders 
can also result in dissimilarities of laws, simply because the foreign laws are 
not required; on the other hand, where protection cannot be found through 
other means, such as contract, the “Force of Logic”330 can drive relevant 
stakeholders to seek a superior method of protection, often borrowed from 
another jurisdiction. 
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The evolution of local laws and path dependence331 can have a marked 
effect on the adoption of laws originating in other jurisdictions.  The 
similarities of laws amongst Commonwealth countries demonstrate their 
common ancestry, but they also owe much to similarities in culture, property 
rights, parliamentary and judicial systems, accounting standards and a 
variety of other supporting mechanisms.  Scholars refer to this as 
“complementarities,”332 where laws which fit well with a broad range of 
local institutions are likely to survive.333 
Kahn-Freund points to the degree of adjustment required to suit the 
laws’ new home and the chances of rejection of the transplant, making an 
analogy between the transplantation of a kidney from one body to another 
and of a carburetor from one car to another.334  Any particular instance of 
transplantation of laws is a point on this continuum from kidney to 
carburetor, and is affected by the political, economic, practical, and 
evolutionary factors outlined above.  Kahn-Freund also points to 
environmental factors such as increasing industrialization, urbanization, 
worldwide communications and the ease of movement of people as 
contributing to a more homogenous world for law, including corporate 
law.335 
Of course, the issue of convergence and divergence of laws across 
jurisdictions needs to be considered against the background of the need for 
laws to grow and develop within jurisdictions.  Each individual instance of 
legal evolution, especially in response to the political and economic needs of 
the particular country as noted above, has the capacity to bring further 
diversity to laws.336 
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This Part has sought to examine briefly why laws may be similar or 
different across jurisdictions.  It does not seek to conclude whether they 
should be similar or different.  What is apparent from the examination of the 
six areas of law in this article is that similarity of laws is associated with the 
considerable protection of powerful corporate stakeholders—shareholders 
and revenue authorities, as well as the conspicuous environment lobby—
whereas leniency of laws as well as diversity of laws have a degree of 
correlation with vulnerable and often forgotten stakeholder cohorts—
unsecured trade creditors, employees and tort creditors.  
The fact that stringent laws correlate with widespread international 
similarity, and conversely that lenient laws correlate with widespread 
dissimilarity, perhaps should come as no surprise.  Arguably, the reasons 
behind their stringency underpin their adoption throughout the jurisdictions 
examined.  For example, many jurisdictions have laws requiring directors to 
pay the unremitted taxes of their companies at the time of corporate 
insolvency.  It is unsurprising that protecting the national revenue base is a 
major political consideration throughout the world, and that similar 
measures providing against corporate default in this context are embraced 
across many jurisdictions. 
Likewise, the extensive acceptance of similar capital raising laws 
reflects the globalization of the international securities market and the need 
to ensure the confidence of shareholders.  Common or similar laws in 
relation to the protection of the environment demonstrate the effectiveness 
of national and international lobby groups.  It also shows recognition by 
governments that the protection of the environment is important for political 
and economic reasons, as well as for its own sake. 
In contrast, the protection of vulnerable stakeholder groups337—
unsecured trade creditors, employees and tort claimants—is internationally 
diverse.  Employees generally benefit from unemployment benefits and 
sometimes from government schemes, which takes much of the impetus 
away from calls to hold directors personally liable for their unpaid 
entitlements.  Trade creditors get relatively little sympathy from courts and 
legislators, and are expected to protect themselves through a variety of 
measures such as diversification and through pricing their goods and 
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services to self-insure against loss.  A disparate group, they lack the political 
power to lobby for a better deal.  Likewise, tort creditors lack a common 
voice to call for legislative protection, in the event of corporate insolvency. 
This leads to a simple hypothesis—that the forces which have resulted 
in stringent laws within a country are the same as those which lead to 
convergence internationally.  The converse applies equally—the forces 
which have brought about a tepid response to protection of a stakeholder 
group within a country tend to produce laws which are not likely to be 
emulated internationally. 
Another, perhaps cynical, observation can be drawn from the 
examination of the laws in Parts II and III.  It is that when legislators are 
committed to defending a particular institution—in particular, the revenue 
base and the securities market—the laws they pass can be quite draconian, 
with very little opportunity for directors to escape liability.  There is no 
apparent fear that the imposition of liability will make directors risk averse, 
to the detriment of their companies and the economy, or that talented 
businesspeople will be reluctant to accept directorships with such a harsh 
liability regime.  
This sort of argument, in Australia at least, appears to be reserved for 
discussions of liability in relation to insolvent trading or the protection of 
employee entitlements,338 yet it has been shown above that these are two of 
the least generous forms of protection available to corporate stakeholders.  
Australia’s new government is raising the issue again,339 and it will be 
interesting to see what forms of directorial liability come under the closest 
scrutiny in this regard. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Jurisdictions throughout the world lift the corporate veil to impose 
liability on directors for corporate faults and defaults.  A range of 
jurisdictions and six areas of law were chosen here for comparison.  There is 
widespread similarity in the laws relating to capital raising, and also 
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considerable overlap in laws relating to the recovery of unremitted taxation 
installments and protection of the environment.  On the other hand, there are 
noticeable dissimilarities among insolvent trading laws, recovery of 
employee entitlements and protection of tort creditors. 
This illustrates two points:  that there are many ways in which to 
legislate to achieve similar objectives, and that, in certain areas, some 
governments do not consider legislation to be required, whereas others 
consider it necessary. 
While there are many reasons for convergence and divergence of 
laws, based on political, economic, practical and evolutionary reasons, a 
pattern is suggested from the areas of law examined—that areas of stringent 
liability on directors broadly, but not precisely, correspond with widespread 
international adoption of similar laws, and conversely that more lenient laws 
are unlikely to be copied internationally.  In other words, even where 
formats differ, governments appear to agree on which questions of law 
require a firm legislative response, and which do not.  Whether these 
assessments are correct is a matter for other research.340 
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